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The United States Supreme Court has failed to grapple with the
unique interpretive difficulties presented by social media threats cases.
Social media make hateful and threatening speech more common but
also magnify the potential for a speaker's innocent words to be
misunderstood People speak differently on different social media
platforms, and architectural features ofplatforms, such as character
limits, affect the meaning of speech. The same is true of other
contextual clues unique to social media, such as gifs, hashtags, and
emojis. Only by understanding social media contexts can legal
decision-makers avoid overcriminalization of speech protected by the
First Amendment. This Article therefore advocates creation of a
procedural mechanism for raising a "context" defense to a threats
prosecution prior to trial. Comparable privileges protect defamation
defendants from having their opinions misconstrued as defamatory
and allow them to have their liability resolved at an early stage of
litigation, often avoiding the anxiety and expense of trial. This Article
contends that criminal defendants in threats cases should have a
similar defense that permits them to produce contextual evidence
relevant to the interpretation of alleged threats for consideration by a
judge at a pretrial hearing. In cases that cannot be resolved before
trial, the context defense would entitle a defendant to produce
contextual evidence at trial and have the jury instructed regarding the
role of context in separating threats from protected speech. Although
adoption of the context defense would be especially helpful in correctly
resolving social media cases, its use in all threats cases would provide
an important safeguard against erroneous convictions of speech
protected by the First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
"I think I'ma SHOOT UP A KINDERGARTEN/ AND WATCH THE
BLOOD OF THE INNOCENT RAINDOWN/AND EAT THE BEATING HEART
OF ONE OF THEM "2 These were the words that Texas teen Justin Carter
posted on Facebook in February 2013, just two months after a deranged gunman
slaughtered twenty children and six adults at a Newtown, Connecticut school.
3
A Canadian onlooker was so alarmed that she took a screenshot of Carter's
comments, looked up his address, and contacted Texas police.4 Police officers
responded promptly. Although they found no weapons of any kind in Carter's
home, they arrested and charged him with making a terroristic threat, and ajudge
ultimately set bail at half a million dollars.' An anonymous donor posted bail,
Law Review's 2017 symposium on Terrorist Incitement on the Internet and the 2017 Yale Freedom of
Expression Scholars Conference. Special thanks to Alexander Tsesis for his comments at both events
and to Mitchell McNaylor for his early and excellent editorial advice. Thanks also to Ashley Messenger,
Caroline Corbin, David Thaw, and Rachael Jones.
** Linda Riedemann Norbut is an attorney for the Brechner Center for Freedom of Information
at the University of Florida, where she received her J.D. (2017) and M.A. in the Law of Mass
Communication (2013).
1. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1983).
2. Elise Hu, As Supreme Court Considers Online Threats, an Update on Justin Carter, NPR
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/201 4 / 12 /01/ 3 6 7 7 7 1533/as-high-court-
considers-online-threats-an-update-on-justin-carterq [https://perma.cc/5XCX-KZPH].
3. See Joe Palazzolo, Teen Jailed for Facebook Posting About School Shooting, WALL ST. J.
(July 4, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732426020457 8 58 34 8 2 9 4 8 3 6 7 7 3 0
[https://perma.cc/K9EY-UD4U].
4. See Hu, supra note 2.
5. Id
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but not before Carter had spent four months in jail, where he had been physically
abused and put in solitary confinement for his own safety.6 Carter awaited trial
for five years before prosecutors finally gave him a plea deal in March 2018,
dismissing the felony charges in exchange for his guilty plea to an unrelated
misdemeanor charge.
The justice system's response to Carter's words may sound predictable
enough, even laudable, but setting Carter's words in their broader context
suggests his real offense may have been speaking in bad taste and having bad
timing.8 The one comment from Carter's interlocutor included in the indictment
suggests his "threat" may have been a hyperbolic response to provocation.9
Moreover, Carter's father told interviewers that his son immediately followed
his alleged threat with a post saying "'LOL' and 'J/K,"'10 common internet
abbreviations for "laughing out loud" and "just kidding."" Even Carter's use of
selective capitalization can be read as a tip-off that his "threat" was merely a
"rant," given that "[t]yping in all caps is Internet code for shouting." 1 2
Other contextual evidence bolsters this interpretation. Although Carter
made the offending comments on a public Facebook page, he did so in a war of
6. Id
7. Austin Sanders, Felony Charges Dropped in "Facebook Threat" Case, AUSTIN CHRONICLE
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2018-04-06/felony-charges-dropped-in-
facebook-threat-case/ [https://perma.cc/43YS-KYJM]. Carter pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of
filing a false report or alarm for which he was let off on time already served in jail. Id. Prior to the plea
deal, the conditions of his bail prevented Carter from accessing the Internet (and thus from
being employed) and prevented him from living with his underage siblings. See Hu, supra note 2. It
is fair to conclude that his Facebook post, and what this Article will contend is a disproportionate
response by the justice system, ruined his life. See id.
8. Katy Hollingsworth, What Happened to Justin Carter, League of Legends 'Terrorist,'
GAME SKINNY (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.gameskinny.com/ydr6b/what-happened-to-justin-carter-
league-of-legends-terrorist [https://perma.cc/7V68-7SCJ].
9. Overall, the evidence suggests that Carter was moody and dark, often speaking of suicide.
Id. While he was in jail, he was put on a suicide watch, and even prior to his unfortunate Facebook post,
his high school girlfriend worried enough about his violent and suicidal musings that she sought a
temporary restraining order against him. Id Nonetheless, a search of his house turned up no weapons,
nor any other indicia of a threat to carry out the "terroristic threats" with which he was charged. Id. Not
that either the restraining order or Justin's inability to carry it out matter, technically, to the threats
charge. Id The restraining order is inadmissible character evidence, and a person can make a threat even
if she never intends to carry it out. See FED. R. EViD. 404.
10. Brandon Griggs, Teen Jailed for Facebook 'Joke' Is Released, CNN (July 13, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/12/tech/social-media/facebook-jailed-teen [https://perma.cc/ETW8-
TTK5]. Neither police nor prosecutors produced the full series of posts in which Carter's comments
appeared.
11. For a recent posting for a job as an emoji translator, see Alanna Petroff, Now Hiring: Emoji
Translator, CNN (Dec. 13, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/13/technology/emoji-translator-job-
language [https://perma.cc/Z3SV-H6DH].
12. See Alice Robb, How CapitalLetters Became Internet Code for Yelling, and Why We Should
Lay Off the All-Caps Key, NEW REP. (Apr. 17, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/ 1 7 3 9 0/netiquette-capitalization-how-caps-became-code-yelling
[https://perma.cc/5VK5-5QJU].
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words with a fellow player of League of Legends. 13 League is a multiplayer
online battle game, played mostly by males between the ages of sixteen and
thirty.14 League players commonly engage in trash talk and hyperbolic
exaggerations.15 Indeed, it appears that Carter's interlocutor, also an "insider" of
the gaming subculture, "trashed" him first, and although she was the immediate
audience of the threat, she did not alert authorities. On the other hand, based on
the fact that Carter's comment appeared on Facebook, a social media platform
frequented by more middle-aged women than teenage boys,'
6 some might argue
that he should have been more circumspect before throwing around casual threats
to kill kindergarteners. Regardless, establishing the full context of Carter's
remarks should be an essential part of determining whether he made terroristic
threats or merely talked trash with a fellow video gamer.
Unfortunately for Carter, the US Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence has failed to resolve fundamental interpretive questions that
should determine whether his words were a felony or free speech. In 1969, the
Supreme Court declared, "What is a threat must be distinguished from what is
constitutionally protected speech."17 Yet, the Court has done relatively little to
guide police, prosecutors, lower court judges, and juries seeking to make the
necessary and difficult distinctions.' 8 True, the Court has defined "true threats"
13. Alyson Shontell, A Teen Was Jailedfor a 'Sarcastic' Facebook Post Even Though the Cops
Never Saw the Actual Conversation, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/justin-carters-facebook-conment-scandal- 2 014-2
[https://perma.cc/Q7FF-2QER].
14. League attracts over one hundred million active players per month. Ninety percent of
League players are male, and 85 percent are between the ages of sixteen and thirty. Drew Harwell, More
Women Play Video Games than Boys, and Other Surprising Facts Lost in the Mess of Gamergate,
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/1
7 /more-
women-play-video-games-than-boys-and-other-surprising-facts-lost-in-the-mess-of-gamergate
[https://perma.cc/LG85-TVHJ]; Anthony Gallegos, Riot Games Releases Awesome League ofLegends
Infographic, IGN (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.ign.com/articles/2012/10/15/riot-games-releases-
awesome-league-of-legends-infographic [http://perma.cc/BU5D-CH4R].
15. Trash talk is common in other contexts. For example, David W. Rainey and Vincent Granito
examined trash talk in college athletics and found that "there are normative rules favoring trash talk
among collegiate athletes and that the rules vary somewhat by gender, level of competition, and sport."
David W. Rainey & Vincent Granito, Normative Rules for Trash Talk Among College Athletes: An
Exploratory Study, 33 J. SPORT BEHAV. 276, 276 (2010).
16. According to a Pew Internet poll, while young adults continue to report using Facebook at
high rates, older adults are joining in increasing numbers. In addition, women continue to use Facebook
at higher rates than men. Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Social Media Update
2016, PEW RES. CTR. 4 (Nov. 11, 2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/201 6 /11/10132827/PI_2016.11.11_Social-Media-Update.FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9W6F-9V8F].
17. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How to Understand the
Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 825 (2011) (contending that "the current doctrine of
true threats is incoherent"); Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts:
Paying the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a HalfDecade ofAvoidance, Minimalism &
Partisanship, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 943,957,959 (2016) (noting the Supreme Court's failure
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as "statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group
of individuals."1 9 Further, the Court has explained that the First Amendment
allows the criminalization of threatening speech because it causes fear, social
disruption, and heightens the risk of future violence.2 0 The Court has failed,
however, to answer fundamental questions regarding the "true threats exception"
to First Amendment protection, including whether courts should view threats
from the vantage of the speaker, a reasonable recipient, a reasonable disinterested
reader, or all of the above; 21 and what mens rea the First Amendment requires in
to clarify the true threats doctrine inElonis v. UnitedStates, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), and stating that "[i]f
one First Amendment doctrine screams out the loudest for clarification, it may well be true threats.").
19. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
20. Id. at 360. The Court also justified criminalization of threats on the grounds of protecting
people "from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
21. In the absence of adequate guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have adopted
various tests for judging whether a statement is a threat. Some have based their tests on the subjective
perspective ofthe speaker, some on the objectively reasonable speaker, some on the reasonable recipient,
and some on a combination of subjective and objective perspectives. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Elonis, a majority of circuit courts required the state to prove that the defendants intended to
make a statement that could reasonably (objectively) be viewed as a threat, either judged from the
perspective of a reasonable speaker, a reasonable recipient, or both. See United States v. Martinez, 736
F.3d 981, 985-86, 988 (11th Cir. 2013), applying:
an objective, reasonable-person test when distinguishing true threats from protected speech.
Under that objective standard, a true threat is a communication that, when taken in context,
'would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act
according to its tenor.' . . .Knowingly transmitting the threat makes the act criminal-not the
specific intent to carry it out or the specific intent to cause fear in another.
Id. (first citing United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965 (1lth Cir. 1983); then quoting United States
v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2003); and then quoting United States v. Fuller, 387
F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2004)); United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 328 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting "a subjective intent requirement that the defendant
'intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious one,"' and holding that a true
threat requires the speaker to "knowingly and willfully" "make a statement, written or oral, in a context
or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm") (quoting United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557-58 (3d Cir.
1991)); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 330, 332 (8th Cir. 2011) ("A 'true threat' is defined as a
'statement that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm
or cause injury to another."' This objective test "does not consider the subjective intent of the speaker.")
(quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2002)); United States v.
Stewart, 411 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Whether the letter contains a 'true threat' is an objective
inquiry. In other words, guilt is not dependent upon 'what the defendant intended, but whether the
recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat."') (quoting United States
v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1994)); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th
Cir. 2004) ("Speech is a 'true threat' and therefore unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would
interpret the speech as a 'serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm."') (quoting
Doe, 306 F.3d at 622); Alaboud, 347 F.3d at 1297 & n.3 (A statement is a true threat if "a reasonable
person [would] construe it as a serious intention to inflict bodily harm."); United States v. Jeffries, 692
F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[A] threat must be communicated with intent (defined objectively) to
intimidate."). Other courts required that the state prove that the defendant subjectively intended her
statement to be a threat. See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (A true threat
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threats cases. 22 The inadequacy of current true threats doctrine is especially acute
in the social media era.23 As billions of people have flocked to social media,
2 4
the amount of threatening and hateful speech to be found there has grown
"massively."2 5 Meanwhile, as Justin Carter's story illustrates, the Court's failure
to clarify its true threats doctrine has real consequences for real people.
This Article seeks to remedy some of the doctrinal deficits highlighted by
the growth of incendiary speech in social media.
26 Along the way, this Article
"requires that 'the speaker means to communicate ... an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence."'
This means that "the communication itself [must] be intentional," and "that the speaker intended for his
language to threaten the victim.") (emphasis omitted); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491
(1st Cir. 1997) (A true threat depends on "whether [the speaker] should have reasonably foreseen that
the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made.").
22. See Paul T. Crane, Note, "True Threats" and the Issue oflntent, 92 VA. L. REv. 1225,1227-
29 (2006) (noting that these matters are unresolved, as well as the question whether threats must be
specific or imminent in order to be actionable). Leading Cases, Federal Threats Statute-Mens Rea and
the First Amendment-Elonis v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REv. 331 (2015) (noting that it is
unresolved whether the First Amendment requires a defendant to have subjectively intended to threaten
someone).
23. See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 147, 147-49 (2011) (noting that "a number of factors potentially contribute to the incendiary
capacity of social media speech," and "underlying assumptions" regarding how "audiences respond to
incitement, threats, or fighting words, are confounded by the reality social media create"); Eric J. Segall,
The Internet as a Game Changer: Reevaluating the True Threats Doctrine, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 183,
184 (2011) ("[T]he Internet is a game changer when it comes to criminal law and free speech [because]
there is simply no pre-Intemet analogy that allows speech to be disseminated so quickly, so cheaply, and
to so many for such a long period of time."); TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, FREE SPEECH: TEN PRINCIPLES
FOR A CONNECTED WORLD 220 (2016) ("The internet has brought an explosion of offensive, extreme
expression, exacerbated by the online norm of anonymity.").
24. Dave Chaffey, Global Social Media Statistics Summary 2018, SMART INSIGHTS (Mar. 28,
2018), http://www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-
social-media-research [https://perma.cc/MJ9K-8G 8 R]; Number of Social Media Users Worldwide
2010-2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-
network-users [https://perma.cc/R9QX-JLFV]. As Professor Jennifer E. Rothman observes, "interest in
threats" has sharpened since the advent and "proliferation of widely disseminated Internet speech."
Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom ofSpeech and "True Threats," 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 286
(2001). Some attribute the increasing amount of hateful speech to growing political polarization.
Political Polarization, PEW RES. CTR. RSS (2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/political-
polarization [https://perma.cc/Z9MP-3RP9].
25. Caitlin Dickerson, Reports ofBias-Based Attacks Tick Upward After Election, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2 016 /11/12/us/reports-of-bias-based-attacks-tick-upward-
after-election.html [https://perma.cc/KUP5-PDQW]; Jessica Guynn, 'Massive Rise' in Hate Speech on
Twitter During Presidential Election, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/10/21/massive-rise-in-hate-speech-twitter-during-
presidential-election-donald-trump/ 9 2
4 8 6 2 10 [https://perna.cc/8QVC-V2HX]. The rising rates of hate
speech are not limited to the United States. Scott Roxborough, Online Hate Speech Soars in Germany,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/online-hate-speech-
soars-germany-950657 [https://perma.cc/5J7L-8UUC]; Mike Wendling, 2015: The Year that Angry
Won the Internet, BBC TRENDING (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-
35111707 [https://perma.cc/J6CU-W48Q].
26. See Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV.




borrows insights from defamation and other tort cases, emphasizing the
importance of context in separating protected and unprotected speech, and the
necessity of independent review of jury determinations of both context and
intent.
Part I examines the Supreme Court's limited body of "true threats"
jurisprudence. This analysis demonstrates that the lens through which the Court
has viewed context in its threats jurisprudence assumes that the Justices, the
immediate audience of the purported threat, and anyone interpreting the words
at the time they were said-or the time the jury interpreted them-shared a
common social, cultural, linguistic, and political frame of reference. Even the
Court's recent Facebook threats case, Elonis v. United States,27 failed to explain
how to interpret threatening speech in situations in which legal decision-makers
do not share a frame of linguistic reference with the speaker or her audience.
This deficit, coupled with the doctrinal uncertainty regarding the requisite mens
rea, leaves legal decision-makers at a loss in separating social media threats from
violent, yet protected, free expression.
Part H explains why context matters when courts evaluate threats made in
social media. This Section explores the facets of social media that make
dangerous and destructive speech appear to be more common as well as the
factors that make it harder to discern threatening speech from hyperbole. The
spontaneous, informal, unmediated, and often-anonymous nature of social media
gives users license to say things online that they would never say in person and
contributes to the harm suffered by targets of both hateful speech and true threats.
Yet, these same characteristics magnify the potential for a speaker's innocent
words to be misunderstood. Misunderstandings may also arise because
traditional context clues signaling a speaker's intent are absent, replaced by new
clues that may be difficult to decode, such as hashtags, emojis, and gifs.
Moreover, different social media platforms have different discourse conventions
and architectural features which complicate attempts to discern both the
speaker's true intent and the meaning of her postings. Finally, speakers of
different ages and backgrounds use social media differently to convey their
messages, adding another layer of contextual complexity.
Part III considers objections to requiring contextual analysis of social media
"threats." Many would contend that the First Amendment need not extend
"breathing space" to posts like Justin Carter's: even if Carter did not intend for
his threat to be taken seriously and his interlocutor did not in fact take his threat
seriously, his comments were still capable of causing social disruption when
taken out of context. Some would even argue that being misconstrued is a risk
that speakers like Carter should have to assume. Part III, however, asserts that
the First Amendment demands precise line-drawing even for threatening speech
like Carter's. Further, this Section demonstrates that it is dangerous, from a First
27. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
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Amendment perspective, to give police and prosecutors a broad mandate to
punish fear-inducing speech by speakers from sub-communities perceived as
deviant. As a result, threatening speech should only be actionable if the speaker
intends her words to threaten or intimidate,2 8 and her intended targets would
reasonably perceive that intent. In analyzing both intent and effect, context
matters.
Therefore, in order to help legal decision-makers face the challenges
attendant to interpreting social media threats, Part IV first identifies contextual
analysis guideposts that should anchor the analysis of true threats. Then, it
proposes the creation of a procedural mechanism for raising a "context" defense
to the prosecution of a threat-based offense prior to trial. Comparable privileges
protect defamation defendants from having opinions misconstrued as defamation
and allow them to have their liability resolved at an early stage, often before they
must undergo the anxiety and expense of trial. This Article, therefore, proposes
a new defense in threats cases: one that would allow them to produce contextual
evidence relevant to the interpretation of alleged threats for consideration by a
judge at a pretrial hearing. In cases where contextual issues cannot be resolved
pretrial, the proposed context defense would entitle the defendant to produce
evidence of context at trial and have the jury be instructed regarding the critical
role of context in separating threats from protected speech.2
9
I.
WATS AND ITS PROGENY
From the very inception of the true threats doctrine in United States v.
Watts,3 0 the Supreme Court has paid insufficient attention to how context affects
the interpretation of allegedly threatening speech. Perhaps this oversight stems
in part from the fact that Watts was a relatively easy case.
Like Justin Carter, the defendant in Watts was an eighteen-year-old whose
rash words landed him in trouble." Robert Watts made his allegedly threatening
comments at a 1966 political rally at the Washington Monument.32 At the time,
opposition to US involvement in the Vietnam War was widespread, and
vituperative attacks on the President were common.33 For example, a New York
Times article from February 1966 recounts that four thousand people protested
28. Adrienne Scheffey, Defining Intent in 165 Characters or Less, 69 U. MIAli L. REV 861,
893 (2015) ("Particularly when assessing online speech, anonymous or not, difficulties arise in applying
the reasonable person test.").
29. As detailed in Part IV infra, the prosecution would maintain the burden of proving the
requisite intent. In other words, this privilege acts as a "bursting bubble" presumption. See Mason Ladd,
Presumptions in Civil Actions, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 281-82 (1977) ("Under the Thayer-Wigmore rule,
commonly designated as the 'bursting bubble' theory, the presumption vanishes when evidence is
introduced which would support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.").
30. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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outside the hotel where then-President Lyndon Baines Johnson was speaking,
chanting, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" 34
It was in this larger political context that Watts declaimed to a small group
of listeners, later described by the US Supreme Court as mostly in their teens or
early twenties:
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already
received my draft classification as 1-A 3 5 and I have got to report for my
physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. 3 6
The audience laughed, but an investigator for the Army Counter Intelligence
Corps attending the rally was not amused.37 A District of Columbia jury
convicted Watts of threatening the life of the President. Watts's lawyer
sought a judgment of acquittal on the basis that the comments could not be
interpreted as a threat.39 Neither the trial judge nor jury accepted this
argument.40 Luckily for Watts, a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court
did.4 1
In a per curiam opinion, the Court relied on its own understanding of the
surrounding political, social, and linguistic context of Watts's speech to second-
guess the jury that convicted him and labeled his comments as mere "political
hyperbole."42 The Court readily viewed Watts's expression as a valuable
34. Martin Arnold, 4,000 Picket Johnson in Antiwar Protest at Hotel, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,1966), https://www.nytimes.com/1966/0224/archives/4000-picket-johnson-in-antiwar-protest-at-hotel-
they-chant-peace.html [https://perma.cc/RV3K-U2SU].
35. A 1-A classification indicates a person is available for military service. See Classifications,
SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/Classifications [https://penna.cc/CGM6-HQ95].
36. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
3 7. Id.
38. Id The statute that Watts was convicted of violating, 18 U. S. C. § 87 1(a), provides in full:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from
any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document
containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the
United States, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of
succession to the office of President of the United States, or the Vice President-elect, or
knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, President-
elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President,
or Vice President-elect, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
18 U. S. C. § 871(a) (2012).
39. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706-07 ("He stressed the fact that petitioner's statement was made during
a political debate, that it was expressly made conditional upon an event-induction into the Armed Forces-
which petitioner vowed would never occur, and that both petitioner and the crowd laughed after the
statement was made.").
40. Id. at 705-06.
41. Id at707.
42. Id at 708. By the time the Court decided the case in 1969, President Johnson had declined
to seek reelection, largely because he knew he could not win due to his role in prosecuting the Vietnam
War. See Robert Mitchell, A 'PearlHarbor in Politics': LBJ's Stunning Decision Not to Seek Reelection,
WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/03/31/a-
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contribution to political debate rather than a true threat,
43 opining "we do not see
how it could be interpreted otherwise." The Court bolstered its conclusion by
a dissection of the surrounding context. As the Court observed, Watts made his
statements in front of a small group of young adults engaged in political
discussion.45 The Court also explicitly referenced the audience's reaction to
Watts's statement-they laughed-and the precise wording of the statement was
"expressly conditional."46 Thus, the Court concluded that Watts's "only offense
here was 'a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition
to the President. "'4 In interpreting Watts's statement as mere hyperbole, the
Court also referenced a significant number of contextual clues, including his tone
and sentence structure, the physical setting, the age and emotional characteristics
of the immediate audience, the relationships between Watts and his immediate
audience, and perhaps most importantly, the broader social and political
context. 48 Watts, however, was an easy case, and the Court viewed it as such, in
part because the Court's opinion shows that it readily understood the conventions
of late 1960s-era political discourse by young people. The fact that the Court
viewed Watts as an easy case 49 also perhaps explains why it sets forth no
elaborate definitions of true threats, rationales for excluding true threats from
First Amendment protection, or multi-factor tests for distinguishing threats from
protected speech.o Unfortunately, the Court waited thirty-four more years after
pearl-barbor-in-politics-lbjs-stunning-decision-not-to-seek-reelection [https://perma.cc/R7CE-WT8X]
("Johnson, however, saw .... [that] he was not likely to win .... because of the Vietnam War.").
43. The Court cited New York Times v. Sullivan for the proposition that our "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials." Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (quoting N. Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
The Court further acknowledged that in "the political arena" or "labor disputes," "vituperative, abusive,
and inexact" language is to be expected. Id. (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 383
U.S. 53, 58 (1966)).





49. Hess v. Indiana was another relatively easy case because the Court readily understood the
surrounding context. See 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (per curiam). There, the Court struck down a
disorderly conduct conviction of an anti-war demonstrator for saying, "We'll take the fucking street
later." Id. As in Watts, the Court looked at the surrounding context and determined that Hess's statement
was not directed to any individual or group and that "there was no evidence or rational inference from
the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent
disorder." Id. at 108-09 (emphasis omitted). The Hess case involved not threats but incitement, as
defined by Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), but the Court's decision nonetheless illustrates
its willingness to cull contextual clues from the record to guide its interpretation of speech. See id at
108.
50. See Tsesis, supra note 26, at 1161 ("Given that Watts overturned the conviction for
threatening the president but confirmed the constitutionality of a statute that criminalized intentional
intimidation, the Court spawned obscurity about what constituted a true threat.").
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Watts before deciding some of these questions in a second threats case, and even
when it did so, it left fundamental questions unresolved.
Virginia v. Black5 ' remains the Court's most definitive statement of the true
threats doctrine and most complete explanation of why the First Amendment
permits the government to criminalize true threats.52 In Black, the Court finally
defined "true threats" as statements that manifest a speaker's "serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals."" The Court also explained why criminalizing threats is
constitutionally permissible.54 Criminalizing threats "'protect[s] individuals
from the fear of violence' and 'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in
addition to protecting people 'from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur. "' Despite this seeming attempt to clarify the true threats doctrine,
the ambiguity of the proffered definition, together with the unusual facts of
Black, sowed significant confusion and ultimately produced no judicial
consensus regarding how to draw the line between threats and protected speech.
Virginia v. Black involved the constitutionality of a state statute singling
out a particular "subset" of threats for criminalization, namely cross burning
"with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons."56 The statute
made cross burning "prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate."5 Black
involved several respondents, one of whom was a Ku Klux Klansman convicted
of violating the statute after his jury was instructed that his burning of a cross
was sufficient evidence from which they might infer a motive "to intentionally
put a person or group of persons in fear of bodily harm.""
51. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
52. Id. at 360.
53. Id. at 359.
54. Actually, the Court reiterated dicta from the "hate speech" case ofR.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992), on this issue. See Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
55. Id. at 360 (citing R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388). These rationales, while useful touchstones, surely
do not permit criminalization of all speech that causes fear or social disruption or even speech that makes
violence more likely. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
56. The statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or
group ofpersons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway
or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an
intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
57. Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
58. Id. at 349. The other two defendants challenging their convictions before the Court
apparently sought to intimidate an African-American neighbor by burning a cross on his lawn. Id at
350. A Virginiajury found one of them guilty of attempted cross burning under the Virginia statute. Id
at 351. The other pleaded guilty but preserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the cross-
burning statute. Id at 350.
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A majority of Supreme Court justices held that states may criminalize cross
burning done with the intent to intimidate, 59 but a plurality held that the cross-
burning statute at issue violated the First Amendment by permitting juries to
presume intent merely from the act of cross burning itself.60 The presumption of
intent was a procedural flaw 61 that allowed juries to "ignore[] all of the
contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning
is intended to intimidate. The First Amendment does not permit such a
shortcut." 6 2 In other words, the Court held that a state may punish cross burning
done with the intent to intimidate but may not punish cross burning done for
purely ideological or artistic reasons. 63
The Court held that even though the First Amendment normally forbids
content-based regulation of expression, 6 4 states may engage in content-based
regulation targeting those threats "most likely to inspire fear of bodily harms." 65
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, squarely placed cross
burning with the intent to intimidate in this category, describing it as a "type of
true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with
the intent ofplacing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death." 66 To bolster this
conclusion, she gave a detailed history of the practice of cross burning, 67 its
cultural uses by the Klan as a tool of intimidation, and its frequent link to
violence. 68 She also described the effect of cross burning on victims (or perhaps
on observers): "cross burning is often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive
59. Id. at 363. Justice O'Connor was joined in this part of the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Breyer. Id. at 347. Justice Thomas concurred in the result as well. Id.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dissented on the grounds that no exception,
including such a rule that allows the prohibition of "particularly virulent" proscribable expression, could
save the statute from unconstitutionality. Id. at 382 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 367. The plurality, comprised of Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Stevens and Breyer, concluded that the prima facie evidence provision in the statute made it
unconstitutionally overbroad. Id at 365.
61. Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First
Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2261,2264 (2004) ("Although the Court concluded
that the government could prohibit cross burning as a form of threatening symbolism, it held that the
Virginia statute was procedurally flawed.").
62. Black, 538 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added).
63. See id at 398 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the plurality's invalidation of
the prima facie evidence provision showed undue concern for the "innocent cross-burner").
64. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
65. Black, 538 U.S. at 363. But see R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 393-94 (determining that content-based
regulations within an unprotected category of speech, such as fighting words, are impermissible if the
state aims to proscribe the mere expression of particular ideas without curbing "a particularly intolerable
(and socially unnecessary) mode of" expression).
66. Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 352-57. Professor Guy-Uriel Charles explains that the Court's historical overview in
Black illustrates several important lessons, including the following: "First, cross burning in the United
States is uniquely associated with the Ku Klux Klan. Second, cross burning is a harbinger of impending
violence and is usually followed by violence. Third, a critical purpose of cross burning is intimidation."
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93
GEO. L.J. 575,628-29 (2005) (arguing Black cannot be reconciled with R.A. V.).
68. Black, 538 U.S. at 352-55.
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fear in victims that they are a target of violence." 69 The Court recognized that
cross burning had other potential meanings; for example, for those within the
Klan, cross burning operates as a "message[] of shared ideology." 70 Despite this,
states can still punish cross burning because it is a kind of "embodied threat" that
is especially intimidating. States may not, however, punish cross burning based
solely on antipathy to any ideological message conveyed.7 2
The Court's decision in Black might be read as an endorsement of a broad
contextual analysis of expressive conduct alleged to be a threat. However, the
Court's insistence on cross burning as a historically and culturally exceptional
kind of threatening conduct limits the decision's applicability to other threats
cases. Moreover, the Court left unresolved even more elemental questions about
true threats: from whose vantage point threats should be judged, and relatedly,
whether the test for threats is objective or subjective. Black provides uncertain
answers to these questions, in part because the Virginia statute at issue in the
case did not directly address threats writ large but instead addressed only certain
types of cross burnings-those done with intent to intimidate.
Black implies that a defendant's subjective intent is an important part of the
dividing line between threatening and non-threatening cross burning, but it fails
to address whether it is an important part of the dividing line in all threats cases.73
The Court's definition of threats exacerbates the confusion because the definition
can be read either as prioritizing the subjective perspective of the speaker or the
objectively reasonable recipient in judging what is a threat.
Looking back at the definition, threats are statements that manifest a
speaker's "serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
69. Id. at 360. Justice Thomas's powerful dissent suggests that the correct vantage point may be
those who have historically been the targets of cross burnings. See id. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[T]he majority's brief history of the Ku Klux Klan only reinforces th[e] common understanding of the
Klan as a terrorist organization, which, in its endeavor to intimidate, or even eliminate those it dislikes,
uses the most brutal of methods.").
70. Id at 354.
71. Id at 355. See Alexander Tsesis, Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate Speech
Codes, 43 CONN. L. REv. 617, 630 (2010) ("True threats fall outside the[] accepted bounds of self-
assertion because they are meant to menace someone with physical harm.").
72. The Court has similarly held that states may not ban flag burning based on antipathy to the
message conveyed by the flag burner, but states may do so under content-neutral ordinances. See Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 & n.8 (1989) (explaining that an arson statute, for example, might have
permissibly restricted flag burning).
73. For commentators criticizing the lack of clarity in the Court's definition of true threats, see
Roger C. Hartley, Cross Burning-Hate Speech as Free Speech: A Comment on Virginia v. Black, 54
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004); W. Wat Hopkins, Cross Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court
ShouldHave Done in Virginia v. Black and Why It Didn 't, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 269,308-
09 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-
Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 216 (2003); James L. Swanson, Unholy Fire: Cross Burning,
Symbolic Speech, and the First Amendment Virginia v. Black, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 81, 95 (2003).
Other commentators criticized the case for its failure to clarify the line between incitement and threats.
See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free Speech, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1325-31 (2005).
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to a particular individual or group of individuals."7 4 If one focuses on threats as
"statements that manifest a speaker's serious expression" of intent, then an
objective "reasonable speaker" or "reasonable recipient" test for judging threats
seems appropriate. Indeed, a majority of lower federal courts adopted such a test
in the wake of Virginia v. Black.75 On the other hand, if one focuses on the fact
that the statements must manifest or contain "a speaker's serious expression of
an intent," the focus shifts to the subjective intent of the speaker to judge the
threat. Some lower courts have indeed read Black to require subjective intent on
the part of the speaker, and some have read Black to require both that a speaker
have the subjective intent to threaten and that the statement is in fact threatening,
judged from the perspective of the reasonable speaker or recipient. 7 6 in other
words, Black resulted in a circuit split regarding what type of intent a speaker
must have in order to be held liable for his threatening speech.
Many observers believed the Supreme Court would repair this split when it
granted certiorari in its first social media threats case in 2014.17 When the Court
granted certiorari in Elonis v. United States, it appeared the Justices would finally
decide key questions about threats and intent, including whether the defendant
must have general intent to communicate the threat or specific intent to threaten
or intimidate, and if the latter, whether the requisite intent for constitutional
purposes should be purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. The Court
also seemed as if it might address from whose vantage point threats should be
judged as well as whether social media threats might be different from their
offline counterparts.78 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did none of these.
Elonis arose from a series of alleged threats made on Facebook by an angry,
divorcing husband. When Anthony Douglas Elonis's wife left him and took
74. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
75. See Recent Cases-First Amendment, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1138 (2013) (discussing
conflicting standards applied by lower courts in true-threat cases); Jake Romney, Note, Eliminating the
Subjective Intent Requirement for True Threats in United States v. Bagdasarian, 2012 BYU L. REV.
639, 639 (2012) (same). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 21.
77. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011-12 (2015). The question was whether 18
U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012), which makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce "any communication
containing any threat ... to injure the person of another," "requires that the defendant be aware of the
threatening nature of the communication, and-if not-whether the First Amendment requires such a
showing." Id. at 2004. Clay Calvert and Matthew Bunker have observed that Elonis "provided the Court
with a prime opportunity to resolve the circuit split on the question of intent, as well as to address whether
(and how) posting messages to online social media platforms, such as Facebook, affects the true threats
analysis." Calvert & Bunker, supra note 18, at 959; see also Christine LiCalzi, Computer Crimes, 54
Am. CRIM. L. REv 1025, 1039 (2017) (noting that the Elonis Court "declined to resolve the circuit split
by deciding the case on statutory grounds").
78. See P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context
in Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages, 37 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 53 (2015) ("Ideally,
the Court should address in its discussion, if not in its holding, whether an online communication is itself
a contextually relevant factor and whether usage of social media impacts the intended or objective
meaning of a communication.").
79. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004.
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their kids, he vented his rage and frustration on Facebook.s0 He posted violent
and disturbing words and images that earned him a federal indictment for
threatening his wife, an FBI agent, a kindergarten, and patrons and co-workers
at the park where he worked. Unlike the Justin Carter case, Elonis's conduct
involved repeated threats against a number of specifically named targets.8 2 One
count of the indictment against Elonis, for example, was based on a post in which
he wrote, in "rap-style" lyrics, that the restraining order his wife obtained against
him based on his prior Facebook posts would not protect her.83 "Is it thick enough
to stop a bullet?," he queried.84 He asserted that the restraining order was
"improperly granted" because "the Judge needs an education on true threats
jurisprudence," hinting that he could win a settlement because his speech had
been unconstitutionally suppressed. 5 He followed, however, by saying:
And if worse comes to worse
I've got enough explosives
to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff s Department. 86
Below his post, he linked to a Wikipedia entry on free speech,87 but this link did
little to negate the overall impression created by the violent and almost unhinged
rhetoric in the post.
Another of Elonis's threatening posts presented a disturbing juxtaposition
of taunts directed at law enforcement authorities, extremely violent imagery
targeted at a specific woman, invocations of free speech rights, half-hearted
disclaimers, and a seeming promise not to be deterred from violence. That post
came after Elonis received a visit at his home from FBI agents because he had
posted about shooting up a school. 89 During the visit, Elonis was evidently
"polite but uncooperative."90 Shortly afterward, however, Elonis titled a
Facebook post "Little Agent Lady," which the Supreme Court quoted as follows:
"You know your s***'s ridiculous
when you have the FBI knockin' at yo' door
Little Agent lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat
Leave her bleedin' from her jugular in the arms of her partner
80. Id at 2006.
81. Id at 2005.
82. Id. at 2005-07.
83. Id. at 2005.
84. Id. at 2006.
85. Id
86. Id (citing the indictment).
87. Id






So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant
And bring yo' SWAT and an explosives expert while you're at it
Cause little did y'all know, I was strapped wit' a bomb
Why do you think it took me so long to get dressed with no shoes on?
I was jus' waitin' for y'all to handcuff me and pat me down
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we're all goin'
[BOOM!]
Are all the pieces comin' together?
S***, I'm just a crazy sociopath
that gets off playin' you stupid f***s like a fiddle
91
At trial, Elonis tried to escape liability for this and his other posts by arguing
that they were not threats but instead artistic expression emulating violent rap
music.92 Elonis had even adopted a "rap-style nom de plume" on his Facebook
page and had issued "disclaimers that the [posted] lyrics were 'fictitious,' with
no intentional 'resemblance to real persons."' 93 He pointed out that his posts
were similar in style and content to those of the rap artist Eminem, an argument
that sounds far-fetched unless one actually reads or listens to the lyrics of
Eminem's Kim. 94
Elonis also requested that the trial court instruct the jury that "the
Government was required to prove that he intended to communicate a 'true
threat,"' but the trial court declined.95 The court instead instructed the jury that
they could find a threat if Elonis intentionally made a statement that "a
reasonable person would foresee ... would be interpreted by those to whom the
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual."96 In other words, the
instruction directed the jury to apply a doubly objective standard, taking into
account how a reasonable speaker would predict reasonable members of his
audience would react to his statement.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2007.
93. Id. at 2005.
94. This segment of lyrics gives a flavor of Eminem's Kim:
Don't you get it bitch, no one can hear you?
Now shut the fuck up and get what's comin' to you
You were supposed to love me
Now bleed! bitch bleed!
Bleed! bitch bleed! bleed!
EMINEM, Kim, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Aftermath, Interscope 2000).
95. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2002.
96. Id. at 2007.
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A jury convicted Elonis on four of the five threats counts against him, and
the Court of Appeals upheld his convictions, holding that the federal threats
statute required only that a defendant intend "to communicate words that the
defendant understands, and that a reasonable person would view as a threat." 97
In other words, the Court of Appeals held that Elonis did not need to subjectively
intend to threaten anyone to be convicted of making a threat; it was enough that
he negligently made the threat.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, but only on statutory
construction grounds, not on First Amendment grounds.98 The federal threats
statute under which Elonis was charged provides that "[a]n individual who
'transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another' is guilty
of a felony."99 The drafters of the statute did not set a mental state for the
offense. 100 Nonetheless, the Court relied on precedent, which permits scienter to
be presumed when necessary to separate wrongful from innocent conduct,10 1 to
hold that the "reasonable person" standard used by the lower courts was
"inconsistent with 'the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-
awareness of some wrongdoing."' 02 Beyond saying that the statute required a
higher standard of scienter than reasonableness, however, the Court left much
unresolved.10 3 The Court held that if the defendant spoke "for the purpose of
issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a
threat," such speech would satisfy the statute's requirement. 104 What is unclear,
however, is whether a defendant speaking recklessly in making a threat, rather
than purposefully or knowingly, would satisfy the federal threats statute's
requirements. 105
As a result, the Court's first social media threats case turned out to be
anticlimactic. 106 The Court merely held that under a single federal statute a
97. Id
98. Id at 2008.
99. Id (citing 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012)).
100. Id.
101. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994).
102. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (emphasis omitted).
103. Id at 2013 (expressly leaving open the question of whether recklessness would satisfy the
statute because the parties did not brief it and "[n]o Court of Appeals has .. . addressed that question").
104. Id at 2012.
105. Id. at 2013.
106. As Professor Eugene Volokh, a well-respected First Amendment scholar, summarized in
the wake of the decision:
We still don't know, following Elonis, whether the "true threats" exception to the First
Amendment (1) covers only statements said with the purpose of putting someone in fear, (2)
applies also to statements said knowing that the target will be put in fear, (3) applies also to
statements said knowing that there's a serious risk that the target will be put in fear, or (4)
covers all statements that a reasonable person would view as aimed at putting the target in
fear. Indeed, as best I can tell, the Supreme Court did not resolve the federal circuit court
disagreement on the First Amendment issue that helped persuade the Court to hear the case.
2018] 1901
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
speaker's negligence would be an insufficient mens rea for conviction. This
narrow holding leaves the First Amendment parameters of the true threats
doctrine as murky as they were in Black.10 7 The Court also missed the
opportunity to contemplate how social media contexts such as Facebook might
affect the interpretation of threatening speech. It is to this issue that we now turn.
II.
UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL MEDIA CONTEXTS OF VIOLENT SPEECH
Understanding the varied and sometimes quirky contexts within social
media is essential to determining whether remarks made on a social media
platform are true threats or protected speech. A number of features of social
media contributes to an increase in speech not protected by the First
Amendment-including threats, incitement, and harassment-as well as an
increase in deeply uncivil but protected speech. Yet some of the same features
that make threatening speech more common in social media also magnify the
potential for misinterpretation. This Section first explores the set of interrelated
features of social media that increase problematic speech and then examines
features that make separating the harmful from the hyperbolic more difficult for
legal decision-makers.
A. Social Media and Incendiary Speech
In 1968, science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke and film director Stanley
Kubrick wrote: "The more wonderful the means of communication, the more
trivial, tawdry, or depressing its contents seemed to be.""os Social media
Eugene Volokh, The Supreme Court Doesn't Decide When Speech Becomes a Constitutionally




107. Because the Court's decision in Elonis involved statutory construction in one federal threats
statute, it did not signal that lower courts had to adopt a subjective test as a matter of constitutional law
for all true threats cases. At least two lower court cases decided since Elonis maintain that the First
Amendment continues to allow an objective standard for judging threats. In State v. Trey M, 186 Wash.
2d 884, 888, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017), the Supreme Court of Washington held that the
Supreme Court's Elonis decision did not affect its use of an objective test for what constitutes a true
threat because "Elonis expressly avoid[ed] any First Amendment analysis" and thus "provide[d] no basis
for this court to abandon its established First Amendment precedent." In United States v. White, 810
F.3d 212, 220 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1833 (2016), the Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme
Court's Elonis decision "does not affect our constitutional rule that a 'true threat' is one that a reasonable
recipient familiar with the context would interpret as a serious expression of an intent to do harm"; rather,
the Elonis decision only affected the statutory requirement of intent. Similarly, in United States v.
Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 169 (2016), the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that it was not
inconsistent with Elonis to continue to judge the element of whether a threat was communicated from
an objective standpoint, at least where a separate element required that the defendant "intended the
statements as something other than a joke or idle banter, or intended the statements to serve something
other than an innocent or legitimate purpose."
108. ARTHUR C. CLARKE & STANLEY KuRIcK, 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY 48 (1968).
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sometimes seem to bear this out, though perhaps primarily because they create a
visible record of how some people really speak. 109 In fact, the informality of
much social media speech makes it more akin to chitchat rather than written
communication, and this feature leads speakers to post things that they would
never contemplate putting in writing in other contexts. 10
The technology of social media encourages informality. People access
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram through phones or computers, and the
technology psychologically distances them from the impact of their words,
leading people to say things online that they would never say in person.11 The
disinhibiting effect of the technology is increased further if the speaker also posts
anonymously or pseudonymously. Even the speed of communication may foster
incendiary speech: speakers respond to provocations before good sense can
assert itself.1 12 And, of course, no editor stands between speaker and audience to
interpose good judgment prior to publication. 13
The informal, spontaneous, often anonymous, and unmediated discourse
common in social media magnifies the potential for incendiary language to cross
109. As Judge Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich have written, "It is ... easy to exaggerate the
harm that can come from a new means of communication," and "it is critical that we not succumb to the
temptation to weaken our protections of speech based on concerns about terrorists and hatemongers and
their use of the internet." See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The
Continuing Importance ofBrandenburg, 4 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 361, 362-63 (2010).
110. Jacob H. Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech,
71 CAMB. L.J. 355, 359 (2012) (contending that prior to the internet, "[t]he bulk of everyday
communications would normally fall below the radar and escape legal sanction").
111. The Internet troll, for instance, is "Cyber Environment Dependent," which means that he
requires access to the Internet to engage in passive aggression. Michael Nuccitelli, Internet Trolls: Cyber
Environment Dependent with Sadistic, Psychopathic & Narcissistic Traits, DARK PSYCHOL. (2014),
https://darkpsychology.co/internet-trolls [https://perma.cc/JXC5-CXA4]. "Trolling" refers to the
"practice of behaving in a deceptive, destructive, or disruptive manner in a social setting on the Internet
with no apparent instrumental purpose." Erin E. Buckels, Paul D. Trapnell & Delroy L. Paulhus, Trolls
Just Want to Have Fun, 67 PERSONALITY & INDIvIDuAL DIFFERENCES 97, 97 (2014). Without the "veil
of anonymity" that the Internet provides, trolls wouldn't exist. Nuccitelli, supra. "[I]f they could not
hide behind their technology, 'they would quickly have their ass kicked for their incessant
provocations."' Id.
112. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1575 (2007) (discussing disinhibiting effect of computer
mediated communication); Noam Cohen, Spinning a Web ofLies at Digital Speed, N.Y. TTMES (Oct.
13, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/business/Media/131inkhtml [https://perma.cc/Q2DP-
7T56] (providing examples of how quickly lies and hoaxes can spread on the Internet); Terence J. Lau,
Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 237, 275 (2011) ("[A]ll
Internet users bear some responsibility for knowing how the Internet works, especially the three
characteristics of reach, speed, and permanence.").
113. Mary Ann Fitzgerald, Misinformation on the Internet: Applying Evaluation Skills to Online
Information, 24 EMERGENCY LIBR. 9, 10 (1997) (explaining how misinformation is pervasive on the
Internet and that users must filter content for reliability); Donovan A. McFarlane, Social Communication
in a Technology-Driven Society: A Philosophical Exploration ofFactor-Impacts and Consequences, 12
AM. COMM. J. 1 (2010) (explaining how the speed of communication online decreases quality of
content).
2018] 1903
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:1885
the line into true threats, incitement, and violence.'1
4 Social media give hateful
speakers ready access to global audiences using a communication platform that
is always close at hand."' Social media thus give hateful speakers a platform to
harass and terrorize targets with seeming impunity and spew vitriol that may spur
others to violent actions.116
Additionally, the contextual dislocations social media enable-including
geographic, cultural, and temporal dislocations-magnify the potential for
violent audience reactions to incendiary speech.'17 Speech that is innocuous in
one country may be considered blasphemous and provoke violent responses in
another;" 8 speech that is humorous in one community may be a grave insult in
another; and speech that is harmless when posted may provoke violence when
viewed.1 19
Social media may also encourage incendiary speech by increasing audience
polarization, encouraging and normalizing violent rhetoric, and enabling the
114. As one commentator has written, "Social media are analogous to open mikes." Ken Strutin,
Social Media and the Vanishing Points ofEthical and Constitutional Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228,
242 (2011).
115. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government Regulation to
Preserve the Internet's Unregulated Character, 85 MINN. L. REV. 215,215 (2000) ("The Internet allows
people to communicate quickly, across the globe, and at extremely low cost."). For a definition of social
media, see RonNell Anderson Jones & Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Of Reasonable Readers and
Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 155, 157 (2016)
(citing Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and
Opportunities ofSocial Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 61 (2010)).
116. See Erwin Chemerinsky, What the Supreme Court Didn't Decide This Week, MS. MAG.:
BLOG (June 3, 2015), http://www.msmagazine.com/blog/2015/06/03/what-the-supreme-court-didnt-
decide-this-week [http://perma.cc/M5F7-DVL3] ("Facebook and other social media have made it much
more common for people to make threatening statements that cause others to fear for their safety and
even their lives.").
117. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 148.
118. For example, the satirical French magazine Charlie Hebdo's publication of a caricature of
the Prophet Mohammed triggered hundreds of thousands of protesters to march in predominantly
Muslim countries. A terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo's offices in France followed, in which twelve
people were murdered. See Cassandra Vinograd et. al., Charlie Hebdo Shooting: 12 Killed at
Muhammad Cartoon Magazine in Paris, NBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.nbenews.com/storyline/paris-magazine-attack/charlie-hebdo-shooting-12-killed-
muhammad-cartoons-magazine-paris-n281266 [https://perma.cc/E5ET-GXEH]. In another example, a
US-produced film trailer called Innocence of Muslims "triggered anti-American sentiment among
Muslims in Egypt, Libya and elsewhere in 2012." See Dan Levine, YouTube May Show 'Innocence of
Muslims'Film: US. Court, REUTERS (May 18, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-film-
ruling/youtube-may-show-innocence-of-muslims-film-u-s-court-idUSKBNOO31R220150518
[https://perma.cc/R78A-PNHP]; see also Tsesis, supra note 26, at 1152 ("[W]hen threats are posted on
the Internet, a billboard, or school blackboard, the object of the message might come across the message
later, or not at all, but the forewarning of harm may be no less real.").
119. In 2011, videos of a Quran burning uploaded to YouTube in the United States provoked
murderous responses in Afghanistan as a result of their perceived blasphemous character. Enayat
Najafizada & Rod Nordland, Afghans Avenge Florida Koran Burning, Killing 12, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html [https://perma.cc/7S3Z-NT
3 6].
Such geographical dislocations of online speech are ubiquitous, and yet we rarely hold speakers
responsible for the violence that ensues, even if it was foreseeable.
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creation of communities united by hate. Much has been written since the 2016
election about the politically polarizing effect of social media on the
electorate. 12 0 This same polarizing effect can lead speakers and their audiences
to more and more extreme forms of expression. Hate, unmitigated by voices of
reason or social norms of toleration, can reinforce violent impulses within
vulnerable audience members. 12 1 Social media gatherings of like-minded
hatemongers can create climates that normalize violent rhetoric and ultimately
violent action. Even the potential size of audiences receiving hate-mongering
speech matters: the larger the audience, the greater the chance that at least one
audience member will respond to a call to violent action. Search technology,
such as Google, also aids individuals searching for confirmations of their hateful
views and lends encouragement and support to indulge violent impulses.122
In effect, the burdens of dealing with the production of incendiary speech
in social media are not borne equally: such speech appears to disproportionately
target women and people of color, especially those who use social media
platforms to speak up against perceived injustice.1 23 Indeed, there are numerous
120. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts & Ethan Zuckerman, Study: Breitbart-
led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader Media Agenda, COLUM. J. REV. (Mar. 3, 2017),http://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trmp-harvard-study.php [https://perma.cc/U8XJ-
MLWK].
121. Peter Margulies, The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and the First
Amendment, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, 33 (2004) ("Lack of mediation is a key ingredient in the
production of polarization and concerted violence against innocents to achieve political, cultural, or
social aims.").
122. See Ryen W. White, Beliefs and Biases in Web Search, SIGIR '13 3, 6, 11 (2013) (noting
that a study showed that "people seek to confirm their beliefs with their [online] searches and that search
engines provide positively-skewed search results, irrespective of the truth," and asserting that this is
problematic because "[a]nswers found using search engines can affect action in the world").
123. Professor Danielle Keats Citron has documented this phenomenon extensively in her book,
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). A 2014 incident called "Gamergate" illustrates this alarming
pattern. In the words of the Washington Post, GamerGate was a "freewheeling catastrophe/social
movement/misdirected lynchmob." Caitlin Dewey, The Only Guide to Gamergate You Will Ever Need
to Read, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2014/10/14/the-only-guide-to-gamergate-you-will-ever-need-to-read
[https://perma.cc/WX9B-XZ84]. More specifically, Gamergate was a social media harassment
campaign targeting several women in the video game industry, largely via the Twitter hashtag
#GamerGate. Id Gamergate exploded after an unusual rift between exes hit social media. Id
Independent game designer Zoe Quinn's ex-boyfriend implied in a series of blog posts that she had
cheated on him with a writer for a prominent gaming site in exchange for favorable reviews of a game
she had developed. Id. Angry gainers took to Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan to protest the "ethical breaches
in gaming journalism." Id. But while Gamergate initially appeared to be about Quinn, the movement
quickly expanded to include attacks on other women in the gaming industry. Id. Anonymous gainers
attacked Anita Sarkeesian after she posted a video series about women and gaming; the attacks caused
her to leave her home due to fear ofphysical harm. Id Jenn Frank, a gaming journalist, and Mattie Brice,
a game designer, said they would leave the industry due to harassment that Gamergate inflicted upon
them. Id As some in the industry began calling out misogyny in gaming, "a motley alliance of vitriolic
naysayers" attacked with threats of death and rape. Id. Quinn and several others had to flee their homes
"mostly for pointing out that the games industry has a problem with representing women. Keith Stuart,Zoe Quinn: 'All Gamergate Has Done Is Ruin People's Lives,' GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014),https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/03/zoe-quinn-gamergate-interview
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examples of social media mobs targeting victims with such extreme speech that
they can no longer live a normal life. Even if the likelihood of any threats being
carried out is small, targets sometimes permanently alter their lifestyles because
of legitimate fear such threats engender. 12 4 This phenomenon happens in part
because within the vast population of social media users, there are "trolls" who
receive joy from inducing fear: 1 25 as researchers have found, "trolling culture
embraces a concept virtually synonymous with sadistic pleasure."l
26
This effect of social media discourse on vulnerable groups emphasizes the
importance of policing true threats, incitement, defamation, and harassment in
social media that make it impossible for victims to live their lives or participate
fully in society. 12 7 However, zeal to eradicate the kinds of threats that deny
women and people of color full participation in social media discourse should
not tip the balance in criminal law toward punishing mere offensive incivility.
Social media daily spawn an appalling number of comments that, in isolation,
may appear far more menacing than they might when set in their true contexts.
Understanding those contexts is thus key to safeguarding free expression in all
of its riotous and sometimes offensive glory without forsaking legitimate
protections for vulnerable or victimized online populations.
1 28
B. Social Media Misunderstandings
The same characteristics that make social media seem rife with dangerous
and destructive speech magnify the potential for a speaker's innocent words to
be misunderstood. People flock to social media because it encourages the
spontaneity, informality, and intimacy of the spoken word;1
29 these features
[https://perma.cc/72YN-WERY]; see also Eron Gjoni, Why Does This Exist?, ZOEPOST (Sep. 12,2014),
https://thezoepost.wordpress.com [https://perma.cc/M735-P
2 4 J]; Stephen Totilo, Untitled, KOTAKU
(Aug. 20,2014, 6:40 PM), http://kotaku.com/in-recent-days-ive-been-asked-several-times-about-a-pos-
1624707346 [https://perma.cc/HMV8-2JQZI.
124. See generally CrRON,supra note 123.
125. See Buckels, supra note 111 (defining the practice of "trolling").
126. Id. at 98.
127. Critics also suggest that those who control social media platforms, including Google,
Facebook, and Twitter, should do more to help uncover those who make such threats and take steps to
curtail hateful speech online. See Lincoln Caplan, Should Facebook and Twitter Be Regulated Under
the First Amendment?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/should-
facebook-and-twitter-be-regulated-under-the-first-amendment [http://perma.cc/K7R6-F885].
128. As Raphael Cohen-Almagor explains, in discussing what Karl Popper calls "The Paradox
of Toleration," societies should not suppress speech or philosophies that would lead to intolerance so
long as they can be kept "in check by public opinion" and "rational argument." RAPHAEL COHEN
ALMAGOR, THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERTY AND TOLERANCE: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST KAHANISM IN
ISRAEL 25 (1994).
129. MARCEL DANESI, THE SEMIOTICS OF EMOJI: THE RISE OF VISUAL LANGUAGE IN THE AGE
OF THE INTERNET 10 (2015) (observing that "writing has assumed many of the functions of face-to-face
(F2F) communication" in the "Internet Age").
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explain, in part, why sites like Facebook have drawn billions of users. 13 0 Yet
these same features create immense challenges in separating harmful from
harmless speech. The law would never presume to regulate all the threatening or
hateful things people say to one another, realizing that speakers often say things
in the heat of the moment that are ill-considered, thoughtless, hyperbolic, and
often forgotten by both the speaker and the audience within moments. 13 1 Most
social media, however, create a record of such thoughtless speech that can take
on an entirely different meaning when read or viewed later. The potential for
speech to be read outside of its immediate temporal context, however, is just one
of the possible vectors of misunderstanding.13 2
Another cause of misunderstanding is the lack of tonal and other nonverbal
cues that signal sarcasm, jests, or hyperbole in oral communications.1 33 If an
adolescent boy tells a friend, "Don't make me kill you!" in a playful tone, nothing
is likely to happen. Within moments, the statement is likely forgotten by all
concerned. But if the same adolescent boy posts those words in his Twitter feed,
tagging his friend, the potential for misunderstanding the words as a threat is
significant, especially if the words reach bystanders who lack a frame of
reference for understanding the character or intent of the speaker.
Indeed, the absence of tonal cues has led to the development of
abbreviations such as J/K for "just kidding," #hashtags signaling sarcasm orjokes,1 34 and even emoticons, emojis, and gifs. Emoticons are a grouping of
keyboard characters "used to suggest an attitude or emotion in computerized
communications." 35 One of the most popular of these is the smiley face, which
130. Facebook Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info
[https://perma.cc/79DX-5X97] (indicating that Facebook has 2.13 billion monthly active users as of
December 31, 2017).
131. Social media enable both synchronous and asynchronous communications. "Synchronous
forms of digital communications require rapid writing, so that the back-and-forth repartee can be
maintained in real time without losing the receiver's attention." DANESI, supra note 129, at 11.
132. Historian Milton Mayer coined the term "contextomy" to refer to the practice of selectively
taking words from their original context to distort their intended meaning. Matthew S. McGlone,
Deception by Selective Quotation, in THE INTERPLAY OF TRUTH AND DECEPTION: NEW AGENDAS IN
COMMUNICATION 54, 55-56 (Matthew S. McGlone & Mark L. Knapp eds., 2010) (attributing the
coinage to Mayer).
133. On the importance of nonverbal cues to communication, see generally MARK KNAPP &
JUDITH A. HALL, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN HUMAN INTERACTION (7th ed. 2010) (describing
how face, voice, and body signals provide context for everyday communications and noting that body
positioning and movement, as well as cues observed from the communicating environment itself, can
affect the meaning of a communication). See also Justin Kruger, Nicholas Epley, Jason Parker & Zhi-
Wen Ng, Egocentrism Over E-mail: Can We Communicate as Well as We Think?, 89 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 925, 925 (2005) (describing five experiments that show people overestimate their
ability to "convey emotion and tone" over email due to the absence "of paralinguistic cues such as
gesture, emphasis, and intonation").
134. Dmitry Davidov, Oren Tsur & Ari Rappoport, Enhanced Sentiment Learning Using Twitter
Hashiags and Smileys, COLING 2010: POSTER VOL. 241, 242 (2010).
135. Ghanam v. Does, 845 N.W.2d 128, 133 n.4 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) ("An 'emoticon' is an
icon formed by grouping keyboard characters together into a representation of a facial expression.
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is formed by typing a colon together with the close parenthetical symbol [:)] so
as to approximate a smiling face. Thus, typing a colon and a close parenthetical
symbol together can signal that one is joking. Emojis and gifs are more
technologically sophisticated ways of signaling an author's emotions. Emojis are
pictographs that often replicate facial expressions,
1 3 6 and gifs "are short video
clips incorporated into social media posts to express an emotion or make a
joke."l 37 Both are highly popularl3 8 with social media users precisely because
they lend to the bare text of postings some of the emotional cues of oral
communication.139 Some lawyers have already recognized that legal liability
may turn on the interpretation of an emoji,140 and judges have admitted emojis
as evidence of intended meanings in criminal trials.1
41
Yet even emojis can cause misunderstandings. Emojis are not always
consistent across platforms.1 42 For example, the gun emoji in the title of this
Article looks like a space pistol on some platforms and like a revolver on others.
Not only do emojis render differently on different platforms, but they can shift
even within documents. Indeed, the gun emoji looks like a space pistol in the
running header of this Article and a revolver on the title page! Emojis can also
Emoticons are used to suggest an attitude or emotion in computerized communications.") (citing
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2003)).
136. Emojis are pictographs used to signal emotions in online conversations. See DANESI, supra
note 129, at 10 (contending that the "intent" of emojis is "to add what can be called 'visual tone' to a
message" and also noting that they are "used largely in informal communications, to add visual
annotations to the conceptual content of a message").
137. Eric Goldman, Surveying the Law ofEmojis, SANTA CLARAU. LEGAL STUD. PAPER SERIES
No. 8-17, at 12 (May 1, 2017), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2961060
[https://perma.cc/3TRJ-7L66].
138. DANESI, supra note 129, at 33 ("According to a 2015 study by the British app developer,
SwiftKey, which collected and examined over a billion bits of data from Android and iOS devices in
sixteen languages, 45 percent of all messages contained happy-face emoji, such as smileys, followed by
sad faces, hearts, hand gestures, and romantic emoji."). Another study found that more than 90 percent
of social media users employ emojis. See Emogi Research Team, 2015 Emoji Report, EMOGI (Sept.
2015), http://cdn.emogi.com/docs/reports/ 2 015-emoji report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6DF-CKPS].
139. The Oxford English Dictionary named emoji its word of the year in 2015. Heather Kelly,
Emoji Named Word of the Year, CNN TECH (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/ 2 0 1




140. For an example of an emoji featuring in a defamation case, see Ghanam, 845 N.W.2d at
145. There, the court determined that the allegedly defamatory statement "on its face cannot be taken
seriously as asserting a fact. The use of the ':P' emoticon makes it patently clear that the commenter was
making a joke. As noted earlier, a ':P' emoticon is used to represent a face with its tongue sticking out
to denote a joke or sarcasm. Thus, a reasonable reader could not view the statement as defamatory." Id
141. See DANESI, supra note 129, at 17 (discussing the admission into evidence in a criminal trial
of a defendant's use of a smiley-face emoji as negating criminal intent).
142. Goldman, supra note 137, at 9 ("Because platforms differ in their implementations of
emojis, a Unicode-defmed emoji will often appear differently across platforms."). Goldman's excellent
article discusses in depth the technology of emojis and the problems they create for legal decision-
makers in a variety of contexts. See generally id
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lead to misunderstanding because they lack a standard meaning.143 in a job
posting for an "emoji translator," a London firm notes that this emoji, 4 , is
subject to misunderstanding because in the United States it means "laughing so
hard I'm crying," but in the Middle East it can be mistaken for grief.14 4 As
Professor Eric Goldman points out, these interpretive issues are made even more
complicated because there are no credible dictionaries of emojis. 145 Gifs, which
often consist of small clips from popular television shows or movies, may be
even harder to decode than emojis: not only do they usually contain more
"content," but correct interpretation often requires underlying knowledge of the
show or movie from which they are borrowed. 146 These examples illustrate that
speech between "insiders"--those who understand a shared decoding system-
can easily go awry when decoded by "outsiders" to the conversation, a decoding
problem that social media make more common.
Another feature that leads to misinterpretations in social media is that
different social media "sites" have different discourse conventions. Much social
media discourse is governed by the norms of informal spoken conversation, 147
an aspect that is sometimes signaled by the presence of frequent typographical
errors, misspellings, poor grammar, and profanity. Thus, it is easy to misconstrue
speech in social media if one applies interpretive norms applicable to formal
written communications. But the interpretive problems run even deeper, because
discourse conventions may vary within a single social media platform, and
subgroups within those platforms may use the platform differently. 14 8 Discourse
on Facebook tends to be relatively civilized compared to discourse on Reddit, 149
but even within Facebook the way fifteen-year-old teens speak to each other is
unlikely to be the same way that forty-eight-year-old lawyers speak to each other.
Similarly, some discussion forums within a single social medium, such as
Reddit, are much more civilized than others.150 Obviously, the medium and
forum within which a message appears, as well as the demographics and
discourse conventions of users within that medium and forum, affect how to
143. See Garreth W. Tigwell & David R. Flatla, "Oh That's What You Meant! ": Reducing Emoji
Misunderstanding, MOBILEHCI '16 PROC. OF THE 18TH INT'L CONF. ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION
WITH MOBILE DEVICES & SERVS. ADrUNcT 859 (2016) (demonstrating via a study based on
questionnaires that significant variability exists in interpreting the meaning of emojis); see also
Goldman, supra note 137, at 17.
144. See Petroff, supra note 11; see also DANESI, supra note 129, at 31 (noting that the "thumbs
up" emoji represents a gesture that "is hideously offensive in parts of the Middle East, West Africa,
Russia, and South America").
145. See Goldman, supra note 137, at 17.
146. See id. at 12-13.
147. See generally Jones & Lidsky, supra note 115, at 166-67.
148. See Kim Holmberg & Mike Thelwall, Disciplinary Diferences in Twitter Scholarly
Communication, 101 SCIENTOMETRICS 1027 (2014) (discussing the varied ways that scholars within
different disciplines use Twitter).
149. CARRIE JAMES, DISCONNECTED: YOUTH, NEW MEDIA, AND THE ETHICS GAP 116 (2014).
150. Id at 96-97.
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interpret the message. And yet these contextual features are likely to be opaque
to those who have not spent time in the mediums or forums.
At a still deeper layer of online context, every individual interaction may
develop its own conventions on the spot. We speak differently to strangers than
to friends, differently to business associates than to family members, differently
to lovers than to mail couriers.15 1 And social media use has become such an
engrained practice for so many speakers that they forget they are being
observed. 15 2 The disinhibiting effect of the technology encourages us to speak to
our Facebook friends as if they are our therapists, with potentially unfortunate
consequences for us and those around us.
Even the architectural features of different social media platforms can
become an aspect of context that affects correct interpretation. Twitter limits
posts to 280 characters, 53 which limits a speaker's ability to signal sarcasm,
hyperbole, or jests. A single tweet, considered outside the string of which it is a
part, may appear threatening in isolation. Perhaps a tweet that includes a
hyperlink to another page (e.g., a blog post), considered outside the context of
the content it refers to, could also seem to pose a threat. Similarly, Snapchat's
architecture limits the length of time any speaker's message or photo is
displayed, which could make an alleged threat seem more or less ominous,
depending on other aspects of the surrounding context.
For instance, in January 2017, one high school student's arrest highlighted
the problem in trying to assess threats on Snapchat due, in large part, to the
platform's distinct features. Indianapolis police arrested a student when a
seventeen-year-old classmate reported receiving a threat on Snapchat directed at
151. See, e.g., Daantje Derks, Man ER. Bos, & Jasper von Grumbkow, Emoticons and Social
Interaction on the Internet: The Importance ofSocial Context, 23 COMPUTS. IN HUM. BEHAV. 842, 846
(2007) (explaining that because social norms make it more appropriate to show one's emotions towards
friends than towards colleagues, people online tend to use more emoticons in "socio-emotional contexts"
than in "task-oriented" contexts).
152. Psychologists hypothesize that this is due to the apparent "distance" between the speaker
and the audience. Noam Shpancer, Why You Might Share More Intimately Online, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(June 24, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/insight-therapy/201406/why-you-might-
share-more-intimately-online [https://perma.cc/E3G6-4B3L]. Computer-mediated communications
tend to lead to over-sharing of personal, intimate details due to the sense of security the Internet seems
to offer. Id. Paradoxically, this increase in self-disclosure online may also be due to the absence of
nonverbal, visual cues online, because that absence also creates heightened uncertainty, which people
seek to reduce by disclosing more. Id
153. Twitter initially limited tweet length to 140 characters, so that tweets could be sent in text
messages with 160-character limits, but subsequently expanded the limit to 280 characters for almost all
users. See Selena Larson, Welcome to a World with 280-Character Tweets, CNN TECH (Nov. 7, 2017,
4:00 PM), http://money.cnn.com/201 7/11/07/technology/twitter-280-character-limit/index.ht-l
[https://perma.cc/GKC7-98WV] ('The new character length won't apply to Japanese, Korean or
Chinese-language tweets. Those languages can convey twice as much information in less space, so
tweets will remain at 140 characters, Twitter said.").
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the student's school. 154 After authorities identified the student who sent the
message, the school released the following statement:
Because of the nature of Snapchat, the content of the threat remains
unclear to school officials. After [police] conducted an investigation,
they were able to track down the individual who was responsible and
the student was arrested for making the threat. ... [I]n an abundance of
caution [we] have requested an increased police presence at school to
reassure students, staff and parents that we take all threats seriously. 1ss
Neither the school nor law enforcement could properly interpret the nature of the
student's original "threat" because Snapchat messages disappear moments after
they have been opened-one of the platform's main attractions to its users-
forcing them to rely on the memory (and possibly skewed perception) of the
student who reported the threat. While there are ways to retrieve the deleted
messages, 5 6 the process requires time-something a school official responding
to a threat cannot afford. When dealing with uncertainty about the threat itself
on the one hand, and the safety of children on the other, the threat will likely lead
to overreaction, fear, and a risk of criminal consequences for the speaker,
regardless of whether the threat was made in jest or sarcastically."
Cases like this also illustrate the generation gap problem inherent to social
media. While platforms like Snapchat, Tumblr, and Instagram have the youngest
audiences, with about 40 percent or more of their users coming from the teenage
or young adult demographic, older audiences seem to flock towards platforms
like Facebook and Linkedn.158 The generation gap within certain social media
platforms-especially when combined with the distinct communication
154. FOX59 Web, Emmerich Manual Student Accused of Making Online Threats Directed at




157. Another 17-year-old, Jashon Jevon Taylor, was charged with the felony of making a terrorist
threat. See Max Londberg, Belton High Teen Charged with Felony After Threat on Snapchat, KANSAS
CITY STAR (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/articlel31622874.html
[https://perma.cc/M5TS-5K39]. Angry that his team did not win the Super Bowl, he took to Snapchat
to express his hatred towards the New England Patriots and their fans, stating, "Let it be know im
shooting Belton tomorrow or tuesday ... Imma find every (person) bragging and blast them." Id. It is
unclear whether Taylor's threat was intended to be taken seriously, considering his age and the larger
context of sports rivalries, which often inspire baseless threats between opposing teams (e.g., "We're
going to kill you," "we're going to crush you," etc.). But if, as suspected, Taylor's comments were mere
hyperbole, considering the surrounding context would be important before finding him guilty on a felony
charge.
158. Social Summary: GlobalWebIndex's Quarterly Report on the Latest Trends in Social








conventions that develop within each of them-may lead courts and lawmakers
unfamiliar with those conventions to criminalize normal or common adolescent
behavior, which has increasingly included the use of hyperbole in almost any
given online situation.' 59
For instance, if anyone were to read the comments on a photo of a cute
animal posted to Instagram, the observer could legitimately think that the
commenters, comprised of mostly girls and young women, were facing certain
extinction because many seem to be "literally dying." 60 But of course, "literally"
here really means "figuratively," and "dying" does not really mean they have
met their demise. As one author's twenty-year-old research assistant put it, "It's
almost like 'dying' has become a filler for anytime anyone says anything
remotely entertaining.. . .Like, if what you're saying won't legitimately put me
to sleep, I respond with, 'OMG dying."'1 6' This type of hyperbolic death can also
take the form of:
"dying" (death in process), "not breathing" (first sign of possible death),
"all the way dead," "actually dead" and "literally dead" (just so you
know), as well as "literally bye" (for when you're about to die), "ded"
(when you are dying so fast that typing an "a" would delay the entire
process) and "RIP me" (after you've had a moment to process it).
There's also kms, or "killing myself," which, as 15-year-old Ruby Karp,
a high school student in Manhattan, explained it, can be used to say
something like "ugh so much homework kms!"1 6 2
This is a generational convention that has developed among teens and millennials
through the use of computer-mediated communication. It is no wonder then that
when an older "outsider" unfamiliar with the lingo becomes privy to the
conversation, she may tend to overreact to a perceived threat of suicide. Imagine
a dad posts a baby picture on Facebook and his daughter comments on the photo
with a single word: "dead." Someone familiar with this type of hyperbole, now
so predictable from the daughter's age group, would understand that the daughter
means, "Dead at that pic cause it's rly cute!!!"l 63 But the comment could just as
easily force the dad into a state of panic, concluding that his daughter is having
some kind of psychological breakdown or needs to be put on suicide watch.
While social media encourage hyperbole through the disinhibiting effect of
anonymity, this type of "death" hyperbole and over-exaggeration that have
become natural functions of conversation between young people is due,
paradoxically, to the performative element also integral to social media use.' 64










People post things in social media knowing that there is an audience.165 It is
perhaps this function of social media that has led to the inescapable edited-selfie
culture.1 66 To boost their personal brand by getting those "likes," comments, or
shares, they have to perform; they have to be interesting.1 67 Hyperbole and
exaggeration is one way to gamer that attention, but as already illustrated, not
everyone on the other side of the screen may have the same understanding of the
true meaning or intent behind the words.
Given the many misunderstandings that can arise in social media contexts,
the challenge is to create legal rules and procedures that allow for suppression of
threats while leaving ample breathing room for everyday social media
conversation in all its mundane, often profane, and hyperbolic glory.
III.
TRASH TALK OR TRUE THREAT? WHY IT MATTERS
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, it is easy for "outsiders,"
including legal decision-makers, to misconstrue speech in social media. Such
misconstructions may include interpreting violent hyperbole as true threats.
Some would contend, however, that such misconstructions are of little concern
to criminal law or the First Amendment. 168 Consider again the case of Justin
Carter. Carter made a hyperbolic, uncivil, and deeply offensive comment that
made light of the murder of schoolchildren. Even if he and his immediate
audience viewed his comments as hyperbole rather than a true threat, one might
argue that speakers like Carter should assume the risk of being misunderstood.1 69
Threats, after all, have been branded "low-value" speech by the Supreme Court
165. Some even become addicted to validation from that unseen audience. See Maureen
O'Connor, Addicted to Likes: How Social Media Feeds Our Neediness, NY MAG. (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/02/addicted-to-likes-social-media-makes-us-needier.html
[https://perma.cc/HQ33-VGFY].
166. <Narcirsistic, Maybe. But Is There More to the Art ofthe Selie?, ALL TECH CONSIDERED
(NPR broadcast July 27, 2015) (transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyld=425681152 [https://perma.cc/WGU5-
P9P2]).
167. See O'Connor, supra note 165.
168. Professor Eugene Volokh contends that speech is most problematic, and least protected by
the First Amendment, when it is "'unwanted one-to-one speech'-speech said to a particular person in
a context where the recipient appears not to want to hear it, whether because the recipient has expressly
demanded that the speech stop or because the speaker intends to annoy and offend the recipient." Eugene
Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and
"Cyberstalking, " 107 Nw. U.L. REv. 731, 742 (2013).
169. Forcing Carter and other speakers to assume the risk of being misunderstood would
prioritize order and civility at the expense of free expression. It is true that the doctrinal boundaries set
by criminal law help maintain the minimal level of civility and security necessary for participatory public
discourse-in social media and elsewhere. Social media companies also play a role in setting boundaries
so discourse can thrive, though some have predicted that social media will fracture into "safe spaces"
patrolled by artificial intelligence. Lee Rainie et al., The Future ofFree Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and
Fake News Online, PEw RES. CTR. (Mar. 29,2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-
of-free-speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online [https://perma.cc/DS65-3HP8].
2018] 13
CALIFORNIA LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 106:1885
because, like fighting words, libel, and obscenity,170 they are of "such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived [is] clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."171
But just because threats are in the "low-value" category of speech does not
mean that line drawing may be any less precise with regard to threats than it can
with regard to higher-value categories.1 7 2 The history of the Supreme Court's use
of "low-value" categories over the last half century or so has been an attempt to
narrowly define them to leave ample "breathing space" 173 so that protected
speech is not suppressed. For example, the Court has recognized that the labels
"libel" and "obscenity" are not self-defining, and the Court's decisions have
carved out some "breathing space" around protected speech, even at the risk of
not punishing some speech that is libelous or obscene.17 4 Moreover, the Court
has barred states from punishing even low-value speech based on opposition to
its ideological content, as opposed to its dangerous or destructive content or
qualities. 175 In other words, the Court has recognized that clearing up doctrinal
uncertainty surrounding low-value categories is necessary for free speech to
thrive.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that all speech that is not squarely
within one of the Court's categories of low- or intermediate-value speech
presumptively lies at the core of the First Amendment. So-called core speech
170. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (holding that obscenity is "outside the
protection intended for speech and press"); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (holding
that libel is not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that fighting words are unprotected).
171. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (noting that the "prevention and punishment" of these
categories "have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem"); see also United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (noting that the existence of a "long-settled tradition of subjecting
that speech to regulation" is required to establish a low-value category). For an excellent article
questioning the historical basis for the "low-value" categories, see Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of
Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015). See also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries ofthe
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV.L.REV. 1765,1769
(2004) (explaining that in constitutional doctrine some things that are speech are simply defined as not
speech-speech incident to criminal conduct is conduct and not speech and therefore receives no
protection).
172. See Rowbottom, supra note 110, at 369-70 (arguing, for example, that even casual
conversation is a way in which speakers "decide how to present [themselves] to society" and "mak[e]
social connections, and people's reactions to such comments will provide a route to discovering social
norms"). Rowbottom contends that this argument provides support, though limited, for protecting such
speech. He ultimately argues for "proportionate" restrictions on "day-to-day conversations" on the
internet. Id
173. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415,433 (1963)).
174. As Professor Michael Bimhack has observed with regard to obscenity, "Obviously, the
difficulty lies in drawing the line between the two kinds of content-a problem with which American
courts struggle. This difficulty in itself has a price-the unclear boundaries of the 'illegal' might deter
not only illegal speech, but also legitimate content." Michael D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom,
Shielding Children: The European Way, 79 CI.-KENT L. REV 175, 183 (2004).
175. RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
1914
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includes discussion of political, literary, artistic, historical, cultural, and social
concerns, 176 but it also includes speech that, put simply, the government has no
justifiable reason to regulate. When a law professor complains about grading
student papers on Facebook, she is likely not contributing to democratic self-
governance, but neither is the government free to ban such communication.
Similarly, when a law student posts that he hates his Torts professor and wishes
she would drop dead, the government cannot jail the speaker because the speech
appears to make little contribution to the student's self-realization.
As Professor Clay Calvert has written, "First Amendment protection for
speech is not based or dependent on some abstract, qualitative judicial judgment
about how much literary or societal value that speech holds."177 Rather, it is
based on the a priori judgment that the government has no business regulating
speech that does not cause harm. 178 The First Amendment protects deeply
offensive, racist, or misogynistic comments not because they provide substantial
value to public discourse, nor even because they do no harm. Rather, they are
protected because they do no harm cognizable by the First Amendment. The
harms such speech cause typically can be remedied by counterspeech, and the
perils of allowing the government to regulate this type of uncivil discourse are
too dangerous to unleash.1 79 This, then, is why precision in line drawing is
176. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment, " 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 208 (1964) ("The Amendment has a 'central meaning'-
a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison's
phrase, 'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people and not 'in the people over
the Government."').
177. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The 2003 Legislative Assault on Violent Video Games:
Judicial Realities and Regulatory Rhetoric, 11 VLL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 215 (2004); see also
Calvert & Bunker, supra note 18, at 960-61 (critiquing the Supreme Court's failure to clarify true threats
doctrine); Clay Calvert, Emma Morehart & Sarah Papadelias, Rap Music and the True Threats
Quagmire: When Does One Man'sLyric BecomeAnother's Crime?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (2014)
(analyzing the "complex and unsettled state of the true threats doctrine through the lens of the equally
complicated, controversial and multi-faceted musical genre of rap").
178. S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost ofHarm
Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1159, 1186 (2000) (describing the
unprotected speech category as "unprotected precisely because the threatened social harms associated
with the speech outweigh any potentially offsetting social value associated with the particular type of
speech").
179. C. Edwin Baker, Scope ofthe First Amendment Freedom ofSpeech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964,
966 (1978) (arguing that under the "liberty model," "the free speech clause protects not a marketplace
but rather an arena of individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions").
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required even in low-value categories,' 8 0 and even for speech like Justin Carter's,
which does not seem to make a significant contribution to public discourse.'s'
Such speech is nonetheless protected where the government lacks a
permissible justification for restricting speech,' 8 2 and the only permissible
justifications are not just harm, but harm that cannot be remedied effectively by
measures short of government restriction, including counterspeech.18 This point
180. Some have tried to argue that speech containing violent imagery falls into a different
category. Yet even violent speech is protected under the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected the argument that violent expression may be restricted lest it lead to violent action. In
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011), the state of California sought to restrict
the sale and rental of violent video games to children, citing concerns that exposure to interactive
violence is linked to antisocial and violent behavior. Id. at 789. The state asserted that the immersive
interactivity of violent video games made them so dangerous to minors that they were analogous to
obscenity and could be placed into an unprotected category of speech. Id. at 793. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument. Id. at 792. Although the Court expressed some skepticism about the value of
video games to public discourse, the Court nonetheless accorded the games full constitutional protection,
stating: "[We have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and
dangerous to try." Id. at 790. The state's attempts to regulate the games failed in significant part because
the Court was unconvinced that watching or reading violent entertainment produces violent action, and
the state failed to prove any causal link between them. Id at 798-99. The Court found the legislation
particularly unnecessary in light of the evidence on the record that the video game industry already
performed a great deal of self-policing by voluntarily refusing to sell to minors video games (voluntarily)
labeled as appropriate only for mature audiences. Id. at 803. Furthermore, the Court was unwilling to
open a new category of protected speech merely because a new technology made the "speech" seem
more dangerous. Id. at 790. Absent "persuasive evidence" that society had long condemned this type of
speech, "a legislature may not revise the 'judgment [of] the American people,' embodied in the First
Amendment, 'that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs."' Id at 792
(quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). Clearly, entertainment that might be
construed as containing threats is common. For example, the following songs might be construed as
threatening: Cop Killer's Body Count, The Beatles's Run for Your Life, Foster the People's Pumped Up
Kicks, Pearl Jam's Jeremy, NWA's Fuck the Police, Carrie Underwood's Before He Cheats, Nirvana's
Where Did You Sleep Last Night?. Clearly some violent rhetoric in social media is distinguishable from
violent video games or even violent lyrics and imagery in popular music. Justin Carter's argument with
his interlocutor on Facebook presumably was not intended to be a form of mass entertainment for a large
audience, and even though Anthony Elonis claimed his speech was just such an entertainment, that claim
is highly dubious given the tone, setting, and factual background.
181. See Andrew Koppelman, Madisonian Pornography or, the Importance ofJeffrey Sherman,
84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 597, 608 (2009) (observing that "free speech theory protects even worthless and
harmful speech") (citing George Kateb, The Freedom of Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM
WrrHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDrrH N.
SHKLAR 220-40 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996)).
182. See Schauer, supra note 73, at 207.
183. The Court in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729 (2012), reaffirmed that the First
Amendment protects even relatively valueless "speech we detest" when the harms the speech causes
can be "cured" by counterspeech or other measures. Alvarez struck down a federal statute making it a
crime for a person to falsely claim that she received a military decoration or medal authorized by
Congress. Id. at 729-30. Though the Alvarez Court was divided, the decision affirmed that the
government lacks the power to censor lies-even lies that offend patriotic values-absent a showing of
significant harm. Id. at 719. The holding in Alvarez represents a sign that it matters what order we ask
the questions: Does this speech have value? Does it cause harm? And would government regulation of
it cause more harm than the speech itself? The Court asked the "harm questions" before the value
question: although the speech was relatively valueless, the government could nonetheless not suppress
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requires some elaboration. The true threats doctrine is based on the prevention
of constitutionally cognizable harms-the harm of putting people in fear, the
disruption that fear engenders, and the disruption and harm of violence itself.1 84
Arguably, these first two harms manifest when a threat is taken seriously by a
target, or by someone charged with protecting the target; one might extrapolate,
therefore, that any time social media speech causesfear it has "inflict[ed] injury
by [its] very utterance" and can be suppressed.' 85 Yet the emotion of fear is so
variable and so difficult to predict that the fact speech puts someone in fear,
standing alone, cannot and should not be the basis for criminal liability.18 6 If
protecting citizens from fear were the only value we sought to protect, we would
simply view threats solely from the subjective perspective of the target of the
threat or the subjective perspective of individual audience members.' 8 7 And if
this were the case, even crime and disaster news, violent programming, or
fictional horror movies could be censored through criminal sanctions because
they both reflect and provoke worries and fear of a violence-filled world."'
But both common law and constitutional law have recognized that tort
liability (much less criminal liability) cannot be based solely on causing someone
the subjective emotion of fear. In tort law, speech cannot be the basis for
intentional infliction of emotional distress liability unless it inflicts "severe" (that
is, extreme and prolonged) emotional distress.1 89 In addition, the speaker must
intentionally or recklessly inflict distress.1 90 Moreover, the conduct must be such
as to be "utterly intolerable in a civilized community."191
Even then, the Supreme Court has imposed further limits on the imposition
of tort liability for emotional harm caused by speech. A plaintiff may not recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech that involves a
it because the harm it caused was slight and could be remedied by simpler, less speech-restrictive means
than criminalization. Id. at 726, 729.
184. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
185. See Schauer, supra note 73, at 214.
186. See Avlana K Eisenberg, CriminalInfliction ofEmotionalDistress, 113 MICH. L. REv. 607,
610 (2015) (explaining why criminal law traditionally has been reluctant to criminalize emotional
distress); see also Christina Wells, Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v. Phelps, Emotion, and the First
Amendment, 1 CALIF. L. REv. CIR. 71, 72-73 (2010) (discussing the variability of human emotions in
response to speech and the dangers of using emotional responses as a basis for censorship).
187. See Eisenberg, supra note 186, at 618-20.
188. George Gerbner & Larry Gross, 26 J. COMM. 172,191-94 (1976).
189. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (A.L.I. 1965) (setting forth elements of tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
190. Id; see also State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284 (Cal. 1952).
Siliznoff involved a garbage collector who was threatened with physical harm and property damage
unless he paid a bribe to rival garbage collectors. Id Even though the threats involved future harms, and
thus were not assaults, the court concluded that "a cause of action is established when it is shown that
one, in the absence of any privilege, intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering incident to
serious threats to his physical well-being, whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances
as to constitute a technical assault." Id. at 284-85.
191. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d (A.L.I. 1965).
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matter of public concern. 19 2 Nor may a plaintiff who is a public figure recover
for emotional harm inflicted by a parody or satire, absent proof that the parody
implied false facts made with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.
1 93
These elaborate safeguards suggest that both tort and constitutional law
recognize that protecting society from speech that causes fear or distress must be
balanced against other values, including the danger of suppressing valuable or at
least "innocent" speech.
The balance struck by criminal law between free speech and emotional
security should be no less speech-protective than the balance struck by tort law.
If anything, the First Amendment should protect speakers even more from
criminal than tort liability. 194 At a minimum, the First Amendment's protection
should shield speakers from criminal liability imposed without proof that the
speaker's purpose was to make her target reasonably fear violence or that the
speaker knew with substantial certainty that her words would make the target
reasonably fear violence.1 9 5 The requirement of specific intent provides
necessary insurance that threats that were not taken seriously by reasonable
people within the speaker's immediate audience will not lead to liability. In other
words, the requirement of specific intent provides some insurance against a
speaker being punished for speech taken out of context. Yet in order to truly
protect free speech, context must be considered in an even more robust fashion.
Again, the intersection of the First Amendment and tort law is instructive.
In the tort of defamation, the Supreme Court has recognized that context is a
critical determinant of whether a statement is defamatory and has directed lower
courts to adopt the perspective of the reasonable readerl 96 in determining whether
192. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (holding public figures may
not obtain damages for emotional distress caused by speech unless speech was false and made with
actual malice); Snyder v. Phelps, 592 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (holding, in part, that First Amendment
protection of speech does not disappear with ajury verdict finding the conduct was "outrageous").
193. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56.
194. Curiously the Supreme Court has tended to interpret the First Amendment as imposing the
same boundaries on the reach of tort and criminal law. See, for example, Florida Star v. B.JF, 491 U.S.
524 (1989), a case brought by plaintiff as a negligence per se action. There, the Supreme Court imposed
the same First Amendment limits on tort law that it had used previously in a case involving a criminal
statute. Id at 536 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). Professor David A.
Anderson criticized this development in his article, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69
BROOKLYN L. REV. 755 (2004). The argument that the First Amendment imposes more limits on
criminalizing speech than it does on imposing tort liability is deserving of further development in the
scholarly literature.
195. See generally Schauer, supra note 73, at 217.
196. The reasonable reader is a legal construct-a hypothesized reader who is a sophisticated
decoder of the contextual clues provided to reach the meaning that social norms suggest she should
reach. See David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law ofLibel, 41 CATH. U.L.
REV. 81, 104 (1991). The reasonable reader of social media texts should be one who decodes them
similarly to sophisticated actual readers--those aware of the discourses and conventions within the
medium and the technological architectures that may alter meaning. Id. at 99. Determining meaning
according to this hypothesized reasonable reader protects important public policy interests, including
safeguarding the vitality of discourse both in traditional and new media of expression. See Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
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speech is capable of a defamatory meaning. Further, the Court has held that the
First Amendment bans liability for defamation based on satire, parody,
hyperbole, and other types of figurative speech that are either not provably false
or cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.' 97 Determining
whether statements fall into these categories requires close consideration of the
words used, but it also requires sophisticated consideration of all of the
surrounding context. Indeed, some lower courts both before and after Milkovich
have specified the types of contextual factors that should be considered in
determining whether an alleged defamatory statement implies a factual
assertion.1 98 The Ninth Circuit, for instance, specified that legal decision-makers
must look at the "totality of circumstances"l 99 and specified three factors in
particular that must be examined in interpreting whether a statement is
defamation, namely:
(1) the statement in its broad context, which includes the general
tenor of the entire work, the subject of the statements, the
REV. 799, 842 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has "clearly endorsed the principle that speakers
should not be held liable for 'mis-readings' of their speech by idiosyncratic or unsophisticated audience
members" because imposing such liability would leave insufficient breathing space for free expression).
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007), Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justice Alito, explained that the First Amendment requires the line between protected and unprotected
political speech to be drawn based on a reasonable interpretation of what the effect on the audience was
likely to be rather than the actual effects. Id. at 469-70. Otherwise, the search for empirical evidence of
"actual effects" would be likely to "chill a substantial amount ofpolitical speech." Id. at 468-69.
197. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17,25 (1990).
198. Milkovich did not specify all of the factors that courts might consider in determining whether
a statement is defamatory. As a result, it was unclear whether the Supreme Court in Milkovich was
rejecting the multifactored tests some courts had used previously to address the issue in cases such as
McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying totality of the circumstances analysis)
and Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same). After Milkovich, the
First Circuit examined the issue closely and concluded that "Milkovich did not depart from the multi-
factored analysis that had been employed for some time by lower courts seeking to distinguish between
actionable fact and nonactionable opinion." Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724,
727 (1st Cir. 1992). Other lower courts have also employed a totality of circumstances approach. See,
e.g., Adelson v. Harris, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467,488-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (apply multifactor test); Yates v.
Iowa West Racing Ass'n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 771 (Iowa 2006) (same); Wheeler v. Neb. State Bar Ass'n,508 N.W.2d 917 (Neb. 1993) (same); Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117 (Or. 2016) (same); see also
Wampler v. Higgins, 752 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 2001) (holding that Ohio's constitution required application
of totality of circumstances approach even to nonmedia defendants); DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION:
A LAWYER'S GUIDE § 8:15 (2003) (noting that lower courts interpreted Milkovich's protection of
statements that do not imply assertion of actual facts in "widely varying ways").
199. Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Obsidian Fin. Group,
LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1293 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2680 (2014); Gardner v.
Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2009); Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152-53 (9th Cir.
1995); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2005) (articulating "totality of the
circumstances" test as examining (1) "the statement in its broad context, which includes the general
tenor of the entire work, the subject of the statements, the setting, and the format of the work"; (2) "the
specific context and content of the statements, analyzing the extent of figurative or hyperbolic language
used and the reasonable expectations of the audience in that particular situation"; and (3) "whether the
statement itself is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false"); Underwager v.
Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
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setting, and the format of the work;
(2) the specific context and content of the statements, analyzing the
extent of figurative or hyperbolic language used and the
reasonable expectations of the audience in that particular
situation; and
(3) whether the statement itself is sufficiently factual to be
susceptible of being proved true or false.200
Using this broadly contextual "totality of circumstances" approach, courts
have begun to take note of how social media contexts affect the interpretation of
allegedly defamatory statements. For example, in Feld v. Conway,
20 1 a federal
district court interpreted a defamatory tweet to the plaintiff saying "you are
fucking crazy!" 202 to be mere hyperbole by looking at the Twitter comment
thread of which it was a part. Looking at the "totality of circumstances,"
203 the
court noted that a "tweet cannot be read in isolation, but in the context of the
entire discussion., 204 The court even suggested that refusing to read the
individual tweet literally, as an assertion of mental instability, but instead reading
it in the comment-thread context was the "way in which a reasonable person
would interpret it." 205 Thus, the court insisted that the evaluation of a defamatory
statement must take account of its social media context.
206
Drawing lessons from the intersection of tort law and the First Amendment,
criminal law should not impose liability upon speech unless, when viewed in
context and examining the totality of circumstances, it would have been
reasonably perceived by the immediate parties to the communication as a
threat.20 7 The immediate parties would include the specific target, if any, and the
immediate audience, if any. The line drawn here tilts the scale toward free
expression by protecting speakers acting consistently with the norms of linguistic
200. Rodriguez, 314 F.3d at 986.
201. See 16 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D. Mass. 2014); see also Obsidian, 740 F.3d at 1284 (applying similar
test in blog defamation case focusing on "(1) whether the general tenor of the entire work negates the
impression that the defendant was asserting an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative
or hyperbolic language that negates that impression, and (3) whether the statement in question is
susceptible of being proved true or false").
202. Feld, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 2-4.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 4.
205. Id.
206. Id For further examples, see Jones & Lidsky, supra note 115, at 159-72.
207. Some might contend, however, that threatening or violent speech is so antisocial and has
such minimal value that any speech that a reasonable outside observer would view as threatening merits
punishment, even if those immediately involved in the communication do not view it as a threat. After
all, social media communications differ from oral communications precisely because it is likely they can
be viewed by those unfamiliar with the immediate contexts, and the speaker must assume that risk (and
the criminal liability that goes with it) because his misconstrued social media speech has the capacity to
inflict social harm. See Eric J. Segall, The Internet as a Game Changer: Reevaluating the True Threats
Doctrine, 44 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 183, 196 (2011) (arguing the Court should "make clear that personally
directed attacks on individuals that could reasonably be interpreted as a real threat to that person are not
protected by the First Amendment .... ).
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subcultures, even where outside observers unfamiliar with social media contexts
might view their speech as threats. Tilting the balance in this manner gives
adequate breathing space for the continued vitality of social media discourse.208
Even more importantly, tilting the balance in this manner will prevent police and
prosecutors from overreaching and singling out for punishment speakers who
strike them as deviant.209 And given that many of these speakers may be young,
politically powerless, or expressing unpopular beliefs, the selective prosecution
of hyperbolic speech misconstrued as threats raises significant First Amendment
concerns. 2 10 Here, the dangers of sliding down the slippery slope to speech
suppression are especially pronounced as a result of the negative social
perception of the speakers.211
Incarcerating teenagers for hyperbole certainly sends them a message: one
suspects that Justin Carter will never again use social media in the joking manner
he did when he sent his alleged threat over Facebook. But if the goal is more
civility in social media, criminalization seems like a poor tool for social
change.2 12 Moreover, the failure to draw precise lines between threats and
hyperbole risks the overcriminalization of innocent speech and innocent
speakers, many of whom are likely to be young people, simply because their
speech is more likely to be misinterpreted by legal decision-makers unfamiliar
with social media norms and conventions.
208. Whether the current uncertainty over questions of speaker intent and the role of context in
true threats doctrine is likely to chill social media speakers is an unknowable empirical issue. Social
media seem to generate an almost unstoppable flood ofhyperbole that might be misconstrued as threats,
and it is by no means clear that an increasing number ofthreats prosecutions will stanch the flow. Internet
trolls may always be with us, regardless of whether criminal law cracks down on deeply uncivil
behavior. See generally Buckels, Trapnell & Paulhus, supra note 125 (study of the psychology of
Internet trolls).
209. If one thinks police or prosecutorial overreach is unlikely, consider the U.K. case known as
the Twitter Joke Trial. In that case, Chambers v. Director ofPublic Prosecutions, [2012] EWHC 2157(Admin) ¶¶ 12, 38, the High Court of England and Wales reversed a conviction of a man who hadjokingly tweeted: "Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed. You've got a week and a bit to get your shit
together otherwise I am blowing the airport sky high!!" Id. 12. Police did not respond to the tweet until
a week after it was made. Id. In 13-14. The conviction was reversed on the basis the tweet "did not
constitute or include a message of a menacing character." Id. 38. The court stated that language may
not be construed as menacing "if the person or persons who receive or read it, or may reasonably be
expected to receive, or read it, would brush it aside as a silly joke, or a joke in bad taste, or empty
bombastic or ridiculous banter." Id. 30.
210. See generally Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOzO L.
REv. 1667 (2015) (discussing similar observations regarding the overcriminalization of speech).
211. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361, 377 (1985) (explaining that
the dangers a "decisionmaker's negative view of the parties is likely to lead to mistakes of a particular
kind, to oversuppression rather than undersuppression, in the application of free speech principles, and
these mistakes serve to create the special slippery slope danger").
212. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REv. 581 (2009)(discussing the shortcomings of criminal sanctions in fostering social change).
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IV.
CHALLENGES FOR LEGAL DECISION-MAKERS AND A PROPOSAL FOR
OVERCOMING THEM
Understanding the context of social media comments provides challenges
for legal decision-makers. Serving judges, practicing attorneys, and jurors,
especially those past the first bloom of youth, may not be familiar with the
architectural features of different social media platforms, conventions of
discourse within each social medium, or norms of discourse governing online
gaming forums or other subcultures. After reading accounts of youths cursing at
each other in broken English, punctuating with emojis or gifs, and typing or
speaking while in the throes of mowing down electronic fiends, some decision-
makers might even feel that jail time with access to nothing but a paper library
might do them some good. Yet, justice systems should never deploy criminal
sanctions lightly, especially when those sanctions target crimes committed solely
through speech. If the law is to avoid punishing speakers merely for failing to
foresee that their words might be misunderstood by outsiders to their online
conversations, the true threats doctrine must be modified. One modification, of
course, is that the Supreme Court could interpret the First Amendment to require
speakers to have a culpable mental state of purpose to make a threat or
knowledge of the threatening character of their speech before the speech could
be deemed a criminal threat. It would also help safeguard speech if the Court
stated clearly that the First Amendment bars punishment of speech as a threat
unless that speech could reasonably be perceived as such. This clarification
would solve the circuit split left unresolved by Elonis. But even with this
clarification, juries and judges can infer purpose or knowledge from
circumstances that they interpret incorrectly because they do not understand
social media contexts. Put simply, law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and
juries do not know what they do not know about the interpretation of social media
speech, and the defendant's own words are likely to be the most compelling
evidence of intent and the most compelling evidence of whether a threat has
occurred. Thus, merely clarifying existing law in the ways described above will
not adequately prevent misinterpretations resulting in criminal liability.
Therefore, this Section focuses on ways to allow full consideration of context in
threats cases, especially those dealing with social media threats.
The first way to bolster legal decision-makers' understandings of social
media speech alleged to be criminal is by the introduction of expert witnesses.
Expert witnesses could offer a way to explain social media architecture and other
unfamiliar elements of social media discourse to the legal community.
213 Much
213. Arguing for admission of expert testimony regarding the interpretation of social media
speech is consistent with the admission of expert witness testimony concerning the interpretation of
"drug slang" or "gang jargon," which routinely is allowed in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that district court did not abuse discretion in admitting
testimony regarding interpretation of "drug jargon"); United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th
1922
#[ -U 1923
as one might hire a doctor to put into layman's terms a baffling array of scientific
terms, one could hire an expert to explain why the relevant context might recast
speech that initially appears to be a true threat as protected speech. Attorneys
conversant with the conventions and characteristics of social media discourse
might also teach or sponsor continuing education courses to help other attorneys
understand the relevant contexts of alleged threats.
Legal decision-makers, though, would benefit more directly from clearer
guidelines from appellate courts directing them how to interpret alleged threats
made in social media. As suggested by the discussion of defamation law above,
First Amendment doctrine setting the boundaries of true threats should guide
legal decision-makers to interpret threats based on the totality of surrounding
circumstances. Such factors might include the following:
(1) the architecture of the social media platform, including space
limitations on individual posts, if any. The architecture of a
platform may fundamentally affect the sender's message. In
Twitter, for example, the 280-character limit may mean that the
speaker must use abbreviations, hashtags, or emojis that may
be misunderstood, or the speaker's meaning may only become
clear when a string of tweets are read in context. Likewise, the
fact that Snapchat messages are designed to disappear soon
after being read might make a threat seem more or less serious,
depending on the surrounding contextual factors, such as the
relationship between the parties. Nonetheless, the architecture
of different social media may affect both the intended and
received message.
(2) the actual language used, including whether the alleged threat
was conditional, specific, or threatened immediate harm and
whether the speaker used emojis, hashtags, gifs, abbreviations,
or profanity. The actual language used is already considered in
threats cases. However, social media threats cases are
especially likely to contain language that is not familiar to the
cross section of the public from which juries are drawn. In the
Justin Carter case, for example, neither the prosecutor nor thejudge seemed to be impressed with the argument that he had
followed his seeming threat with "J/K" to indicate that he wasjust kidding. Perhaps they did not know the meaning of the
abbreviation, or perhaps they were simply unconvinced that it
altered either his intent or the effect of the post. Nonetheless,
the specific language a speaker uses obviously affects meaning
Cir. 1997) ("Drug traffickers' jargon is a specialized body of knowledge, familiar only to those wise in
the ways of the drug trade, and therefore a fit subject for expert testimony."); People v. Anderson, 149
A.D.3d 1407, 1413 (3d Dep't 2017) (allowing expert testimony regarding drug slang). In one such case
involving gang jargon, the court noted that the proffered expert testimony was "based on standard
principles of language interpretation, the foundation of which is repetition and context." See United
States v. Diaz, 2006 WL 2699042, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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and that language must be interpreted correctly if the speaker's
meaning is to be discerned.
(3) the overall tone of both the specific post and the conversation,
if any, of which it is a part. Just like informal conversations
offline, conversations online can range from highly formal and
serious to highly informal and facetious, sarcastic, bantering, or
hyperbolic. Where a post or conversation falls along this range
helps determine its meaning. "I'll kill you" when said to an
estranged ex-wife as part of a broader unhinged tirade, as in the
Elonis case, should be interpreted differently than a wife
posting on Facebook "I'll kill you @" in response to her
husband's post taunting her that he ate the last piece of
cheesecake in the refrigerator at home. Of course, we know this
intuitively, but it is helpful to bring this intuition to the fore
when dealing with social media contexts with which not
everyone is familiar.
(4) the likely characteristics of the immediate audience, including
the likely size and demographics of the audience and the
relationship between the speaker and his or her audience. One
speaks to friends and lovers differently than one speaks to
strangers, and young people tend to speak to each other
differently when parents are not listening than when they are.
These contextual factors matter when interpreting true threats,
just as they matter when interpreting defamation. The age,
education, sex, and race of the speaker and his or her audience
also affect interpretation.2 1 4 For example, the Supreme Court in
Watts took notice that the audience of the teenage speaker's
purported threat to shoot then-President Lyndon Johnson was
also young and also opposed to the Vietnam War, as well as the
fact that they laughed upon hearing the "threat." In Watts, these
contextual factors were obvious to the Court, but the Court
would be far less likely to understand contextual features that
would be similarly obvious to social media "insiders," which is
why explicit examination and expert testimony may sometimes
be necessary.
(5) the social media platform used and the conventions ofspeaking
within that platform, and whether the speech occurred within a
distinctive subforum. Some social media platforms, put simply,
host more restrained discourse than others. Certain subforums
214. See, e.g., Sherron B. Kenton, Speaker Credibility in Persuasive Business Communication:
A Model Which Explains Gender Differences, 26 INT'L J. OF Bus. COMM. 143, 143 (1989) (surveying
research on source credibility and gender differences); Lawrence Hosman, Powerful and Powerless
Speech Styles and Their Relationship to Perceived Dominance and Control, in THE EXERCISE OF
POWERIN COMMUNICATION 221, 221 (R. Schulze et al. eds,, 2015) ("[R]eport[ing] the findings ofover




on Reddit, for example, are replete with violent rhetoric and
hate speech, which would, in some instances, lend credence to
an alleged threat and in others mark it as hyperbole when
blended with other factors.
(6) the surrounding context of the speaker's posting, including
whether it was a response to another speaker's post. If a teen
girl posts a photo on Facebook and her friend responds "Dead!"
and then they carry on the conversation about where to go to
lunch, the context tends to suggest the word "dead" was not a
threat. Taken out of context, however, the possibility for
misunderstanding is high. At a minimum, therefore, legal
decision-makers should consider alleged threats set in their
immediate surrounding contexts in order to avoid the risk of
criminalizing innocent speakers.
Even equipped with a list of contextual factors to consider, however, police,
prosecutors, judges, and juries may still struggle to correctly interpret social
media speech. Thus, we propose the creation of a more formal "context defense"
to make sure the First Amendment rights of those accused of making criminal
threats are safeguarded.
The defense would work as follows. Once the accused is charged with
making a criminal threat, the accused may invoke context as a defense to
liability. Once the accused invokes the defense, the trial court judge should
conduct a pretrial hearing to establish two prerequisites to proceeding to trial.
First, the judge should evaluate whether there is probable cause to believe that
the defendant actually made the alleged threat. This is a concern in online
settings where digital images or communications may be altered,215 and the
Internet includes so many avatars and aliases that it may not always be clear that
the person accused of making threats actually made the threats. The burden of
proof on this issue should be on the prosecution because attaching wrongful
conduct to the actual defendant is an essential prerequisite to imposing criminal
liability.
If this threshold is met, the court should give the defendant an opportunity
to show that the statement made or posted was not an actual threat based on the
totality of the surrounding context In examining context, it is important to
understand that context affects both the mens rea and actus reus of the offense.
Context can be circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed the requisite
mens rea to make a threat, or, conversely, context can negate the requisite mens
rea. By the same token, the actus reus of the threat exists by virtue of the effect
215. Online impersonation is a significant enough problem that a number of states have adopted
laws criminalizing it. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.6(2008); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-45-33 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2011).
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of the defendant's words on his target and/or his audience, and context affects
how reasonable targets or audiences perceive the defendant's words.
2 16
At the pretrial hearing, the defendant should have a right to bring an expert
witness or otherwise present probative evidence that his statements were not
threats when viewed in their full context. If the court determines that there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant intended (that is, either purposely or
knowingly) to make what a reasonable target of the threat or reasonable reader
within the immediate audience of the post would view as a true threat,
217 then
the case may proceed to trial. If the court determines that, when viewed in the
appropriate context, the defendant's alleged threats were not true threats, then
the case should be dismissed.218
This context defense procedure is not a radical departure from existing
doctrine. Such pretrial hearing procedures are used in other contextS
219 to
safeguard important rights such as the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel 220 or the Fourth Amendment right to be free of illegal searches and
seizures. 2 2 1 Thus, it is logical that such pretrial hearings should be used to protect
criminal defendants' First Amendment rights as well.
This brief hearing process has the benefits of moving the matter off of a
judge's docket more quickly than a trial, saving the state the resources of
prosecuting a defendant for uttering potentially protected speech, and sparing an
innocent person the costs of mounting a full defense, not to mention sparing him
or her the unfortunate consequences of extended incarceration. The hearing
216. This so-called defense is what is sometimes called a "failure-of-proof' defense, that is, "one
in which the defendant introduces evidence ... demonstrat[ing] that the prosecution has failed to prove
an essential element of the offense charged." See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
204 (6th ed. 2012).
217. It may sometimes be difficult to ascertain who the "immediate audience" of a social media
post is, but consideration should be given to factors such as whether the defendant limited his or her
postings to "friends," that is, to a selected group; whether he or she addressed or targeted a particular
person or groups of persons; and whether the post was part of an ongoing dialogue with a particular
person or groups of persons. If, as in the Justin Carter case, the defendant's posting was a direct response
to another speaker's posting, that speaker should be considered the immediate audience, as well as any
others who have commented on the dispute contemporaneously.
218. The burden of establishing probable cause remains on the prosecution.
219. Probably the most familiar example is the pretrial suppression hearing, in which courts are
asked to determine which evidence is inadmissible in the defendant's criminal trial. See Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977) (confession obtained in violation of defendant's right to advice of
counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (evidence obtained through interrogation
absent waiver of fifth amendment rights); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964) (involuntary
confession); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence seized in violation of fourth
amendment); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939) (evidence obtained as a result of
knowledge gained from illegal wiretap); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (evidence seized as an indirect result of fourth amendment violation); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment in federal trial).
220. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406 (holding inadmissible confession obtained in violation of
defendant's right to advice of counsel).




process might also curtail any tendencies of prosecutors to overreach and charge
dim youths with crimes such as making terroristic threats, when they have done
nothing more than to make hyperbolic and ill-advised comments in a public
forum while playing a computer game.
For those defendants who actually go to trial, a defense based on context
should be available. Asserting the context defense would allow the defendant to
bring expert testimony to help explain the proper interpretation of his or her
words. That defense would allow a defendant to show that although the
defendant made certain statements, those statements were, when viewed within
the proper context, not true threats because the defendant lacked the requisite
intent to threaten.
Some might contend that since the burden of proof is already on the
prosecution to establish the actus reus and mens rea of the offense the context
defense is unnecessary. Yet prosecutors, judges, and juries do not know what
they do not know. They may assume they share interpretive conventions with the
defendant that they do not in fact share, especially in cases involving threats
made in social media by members of a younger generation. The context defense
therefore provides a mechanism to supply or enrich the relevant context and
focus attention on the kinds of factors that should ultimately determine guilt or
innocence in social media threats cases.
As another way of focusing decision-makers' attention in the right place,
invoking the context defense should entitle the criminal defendant to the benefit
of a special instruction explaining the contextual factors that may be relevant in
deciding whether the defendant's words were threats or mere hyperbole. After
specifying the relevant factors, the instruction might clarify that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution and simply ask the jury to determine whether the
defendant committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality
of circumstances. The more focused inquiry supplied by the special instruction
would then lend itself to more informed judicial review.
CONCLUSION
This Article, put simply, represents a plea for more precision in drawing
the line between trash talk and terrorist threats. It may seem counterintuitive to
argue for the protection of those whose loose language can be easily
misunderstood as a threat. Yet First Amendment theory's concerns about
selective targeting of disfavored speakers and its demand that speech cause
cognizable harm in order to be actionable weigh against criminalizing speech
that was not intended to threaten and/or was not understood by its targets as
intimidation or threats. Overcriminalization concerns should be especially acute
in cases in which defendants are disproportionately likely to be adolescents
engaged in discourse over social media. This is true even though the prevalence
of violent and hateful speech in social media is a formidable concern for those
of us committed to fostering meaningful and inclusive public discourse.
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Nonetheless, it is important to ensure that the proffered cure for disordered
discourse in social media is not worse than the disease. This Article has shown
that the interpretation of social media speech by legal decision-makers is rife
with possibilities for misunderstanding and has tendered an antidote. This
antidote, in the form of a context defense, allows those charged with making
terroristic threats to show, at a very early stage of criminal proceedings, the
context in which their alleged threats occurred negated their criminal culpability.
Moreover, the defense provides a guide for legal decision-makers at trial as to
the factors that influence proper interpretation of alleged threats within social
media. This, and no less, is what courts should interpret the First Amendment to
require, just as they have done in other legal contexts.
#1 -TU
Justin Carter
I'm tucked In th head aright, I
think I'na SHOOT UP A
KINDERGARTEN
Justin Carter
AND WATCH THE SLOOD OF THE
0040CENT RAIN DOMN
Hannah Love
Ihop you fuckingbrWng nhe you
facig pck
Justin Carter
AND EAT THEEATING HEART OF
ONE OF THE
1 ko C1 f
Figure 1: A screenshot of the post by Justin Carter that gave rise to his
prosecution.222
222. Hollingsworth, supra note 8.
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